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I. Introduction
James Madison wrote that in designing the structure of a well-ordered
government, writers of constitutions should give "those who administer each
department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist
encroachments ofthe others.... Ambition must be made to counteract ambi-
tion. 1 The framers of the United States Constitution thought that interbranch
strife would keep each branch in check.2 Thus, the Constitution divides author-
ity among legislative, executive, and judicial branches The Constitution
grants responsibility to each department, but each branch enjoys some control
over the actions of the others.4 The contest for power among the branches
produces the stability the framers considered necessary for good government.'
Madison predicted that tyranny would result, however, if one branch were to
become too powerful and to take unto itself-the functions of another.6
State constitutions reflect similar organization; the constitutions of states
existing at the time of the federal Constitutional Convention influenced the
writers of the federal Constitution! Furthermore, state constitutions written
after the adoption of the United States Constitution mirror the federal separa-
1. T E FEDERALIST No. 51, at 347 (James Madison) (Carl van Doren ed., 1973).
2. See id. at 348 ("[The constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such
a manner as that each may be a check on the other - that the private interest of every individual
may be a sentinel over the public rights.").
3. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § I (establishing legislative branch); id. art. IL § 1 (authorizing
executive branch); id. art. IL, § 1 (chartering judicial branch).
4. See, e.g., id. art. L § 7, cl. 4 (establishing presidential veto); id. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (pro-
scribing congressional power over all appropriations); id. art. 1, § 2, cl. 4 (establishing Senate
check on presidential power to make treaties).
5. See generally TBE FEDERALISTNO. 51, supra note 1 (promoting merits ofestablishing
checks and balances among independent government branches as means to achieve stability).
6. See id. at 347 (warning against "gradual concentration of the several powers [of gov-
ernment] in the same department").
7. See MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. 30 (providing in 1780 for division of government power
between independent executive, legislative, and judicial branches); THE FEDERAIST No. 47,
at 324-29 (James Madison) (Carl van Doren ed., 1973) (discussing separation-of-powers
provisions of state constitutions existing in 1788).
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tion of powers scheme.' Thus, states experience interbranch struggles for
power much like those the framers envisioned that the federal government
would experience.9
This Note discusses one interbranch struggle currently being waged
throughout the country. the battle between courts and legislatures for control
over the tort system."0 The conflict over modem tort reform originated in the
liability insurance crises of the 1970s and 1980s.1 The number of multi-
million dollar jury verdicts doubled between 1972 and 1983.2 The two
decades saw huge increases in the cost of medical malpractice insurance and
general liability insurance.'3 In response to insurance cost increases, nearly
every state adopted tort reform measures of some sort. 4 The statutes pro-
posed several different methods of solving the liability crisis, such as the
8. See, e.g., IL. CONST. art II, § I (establishing three independent branches in state
government); OnIo CONST. art. I1, § 1 (prescribing legislative branch); itl art. Ill, § 5 (charter-
ing executive branch); id. art. IV, § I (authorizing judicial branch); OR. CONST. art. I, § 1
(establishing three independent branches).
9. Compare infra Parts IL Ill, & IV (discussing struggle between legislative and judicial
branches over tort system), with supra notes 1-6 and accompanying text (explaining framers'
anticipation of interbranch tension). The dispute over the proper boundaries between judicial
and legislative authority is a timely one, and was an underlying theme in the proceedings
surrounding the recent disputed presidential election. Cf Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243, 1249
(Fa. 2000) ("Although courts are, and should be, reluctant to interject themselves in essentially
political controversies, the Legislature has directed.. . that an election contest shall be resolved
in a judicial forum."), rev'd sub nom. Bush v. Gore, 121 S. Ct. 525 (2000); Gore, 772 So. 2d
at 1270 (Wells, C.J., dissenting) ("[Tjhere is uncertainty as to whether the Florida Legislature
has ever given the courts of Florida any power to resolve contests or controversies in respect
to presidential elections.").
10. See Stephen J. Werber, Ohio Tort Reform Versus the Ohio Constitution, 69 TEMP. L.
REV. 1155, 1156 (1996) ("The Ohio Constitution forms the battleground for an ongoing war
between the tort policies and power of the judicial branch and those of the legislative and
executive branches of state government.").
11. See PETERW. HUBER, LAMILMTY: THELEGALREVOUMIONANDiTS CONSEQUENCES
138-42 (discussing liability insurance crisis of 1970s and 1980s). Legislatures and courts have
struggled over tort reform before, most notably in the context of workers compensation laws,
which replaced common law tort actions with state insurance schemes. See Ives v. S. Buffalo
Ry. Co., 94 N.E. 431,441 (N.Y. 1911) (declaring thatworkers compensation law was unconsti-
tutional taking of property without compensation).
12. See JOENG. FLEMING, THEAMRICANTORTPROCEsS 16-17 (1988) (reporting doub-
ling in number of million-dollarjury verdicts between 1972 and 1983).
13. See HUBER, supra note 11, at 138-41 (reporting increase in insurance premiums);
Scott E. Harrington, Prices and Profits in the Liability Insurance Market, in LIABIIXTY:
PERSPEcTivE AND POLIcY 42,42 (Robert E. Litan & Clifford Winston eds., 1988) (same).
14. See Elizabeth A. Schartz at al., Comment, Caps, "Crisis" and Constitutionality -
Evaluating the 1986 Kansas MedicalMalpractice Legislation, 35 U. KAN. L. REV. 763, 765
n.18 (1987) (reporting that nearly every state enacted tort reform laws).
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abolition of the collateral source rule,'" the establishment of panels of lawyers
and doctors to screen medical malpractice claims, and the creation of a
statutory limit on damages.'
6
This Note discusses the controversy between courts and legislatures over
damage caps. Various legislatures across the country responded to the per-
ceived liability crisis by attempting to limit the liability oftortfeasors. 17 Some
statutes limit only noneconomic damages; others limit all damages in specific
types of claims.'8 Whatever form the statutes take, parties finding their tort
15. Cf infra note 16 (mentioning collateral source rule). The collateral source rule allows
a jury, when determining the amount by -which an injury damages a plaintiff, to consider
evidence that a plaintiff's insurance compensated the plaintiff for the injury. See BLAcK's LAW
DICTIONARY 256 (7th ed. 1999) (defining collateral source rule).
16. See Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1062 (111. 1997) (outlining pro-
visions of Illinois reform statute); Werber, supra note 10, at 1157 (listing provisions of Ohio
reform statute). The Ohio statute provides a good example of various provisions aimed at
reducing liability. The statute redefines "defect" to make showing a defective design more diffi-
cult Werber, supra note 10, at 1171. It eliminates the liability of successor corporations for
their predecessors' products and limits the situations in which courts can impose liability on an
industry as a whole. Id. at 1172-73. The statute reforms the rules of evidence to allow tort-
feasors to defend themselves by blaming an injury on the plaintiff's substance abuse, id. at
1173-74, and by showing that the plaintiff failed to heed a product recall notice, id. at 1174-75.
Under the new statute, tortfeasors might defend against a punitive damages claim by showing
that they complied fully with government regulations. IM. at 1176. The statute also contains
a fifteen-year statute of repose for wrongful death actions, forbidding actions when a product
more than fifteen years old causes a death. Id. at 1177-78. Another portion of the law requires
a plaintiff to bring medical malpractice actions within six years from the act or omission causing
the injury. Id. at 1192-96. The law abolishes wrongful death actions when the decedent
receives compensation for an injury while living. l at 1178-80. The legislature also changed
the standard for summary judgment in toxic tort cases so that defendants would be able to obtain
easier dismissal ofclaims. Id. at 1180-83. The act abrogated the collateral source rule, allowing
a jury to consider evidence that a victim's insurance company has already compensated an
injury. Id. at 1183-86. Finally, the legislature attempted to place limits on punitive and com-
pensatory damages. Id. at 1196-99.
17. See, e.g., 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-1115.1 & 1115.2 (West Supp. 1999) (limiting
noneconomic damages to $500,000 per plaintiff); KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 60-19a01 & 60-19a02
(1994) (limiting noneconomic damages to $250,000); MD. CODEANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 11-
108 (Mlchie Supp. 2000) (limiting noneconomic damagesto $500,000); OHIO REV. CODEANN.
§ 2323.54 (West Supp. 2000) (limiting noneconomic damages to certain amounts depending
on nature of injury); OR. REV. STAT. § 18.560 (1999) (limiting noneconomic damages to
$500,000); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.14 (Michie 2000) (limiting all medical malpractice
damages to $1.5 million). The legislatures thought they acted in response to rising liability
costs. See Civil Justice Reform Amendments of 1995, Pub. Act 89-7,1995 Ill. Laws 286, 286-
88 (finding that "current systemic costs of tort liability are unacceptable"); Act of Sept 26,
1996, Am. Sub. H.B. 350, 146 Ohio Laws 3567, 4028 (citing state's interest in "stabilizing
costs" as reason for enacting damage cap).
18. Compare KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-19a02 (1994) (limiting only noneconomic damages
to $250,000), with VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.15 (Michie 2000) (limiting damages of all types
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recovery suddenly limited have often challenged the statutes on state constitu-
tional grounds, beseeching state supreme courts to curtail an allegedly uncon-
stitutional exercise of legislative power. 9 Often, courts have sustained the
challenges and struck down the law." This Note examines constitutional
challenges to damage caps in six states: three states in which the caps fell
(Illinois, Ohio, and Oregon)2 and three states in which they survived (Kansas,
Maryland, and Virginia).
This Note focuses on three theories that parties have used to attack the
damage cap statutes.' Part 1H explores challenges based on the right to ajury
trial, an issue that involves questions concerning the power of juries at corn-
in medical malpractice cases to $1.5 million). Often, the statutes define "noneconomic dam-
ages" in similar terms. For example, under the Maryland statute, noneconomic damages include
"pain, suffering, inconvenience, physical impairment, disfigurement, [and] loss of consortium."
MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & JuD. PRoc. § 11-108 (Mlchie 1998). In Ohio, they include loss
resulting from "pain and suffering, loss of society, consortium, companionship, care, assistance,
attention, protection, advice, counsel, instruction, training, or education, mental anguish, and
any other intangible loss." OHIO REV. CODEANN. § 2323.54(AX2) (West Supp. 1998).
19. See infra Parts I, II, & IV (discussing constitutional challenges to damage cap
statutes).
20. See infra note 21 (listing several cases holding that damage caps violate state consti-
tutions).
21. See Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1066-81 (Ill. 1997) (striking
down damages cap); State ex rel Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062,
1092-95 (Ohio 1999) (same); Lakin v. Senco Prods., Inc., 987 P.2d 463,467-475 (Or. 1999)
(same).
22. See Samsel v. Wheeler Transp. Servs., Inc., 789 P.2d 541, 557-58 (Kan. 1990) (up-
holding damages cap); Murphy v. Edmonds, 601 A.2d 102,107-18 (Md. 1992) (same); Pulliam
v. Coastal Emergency Servs. of Richmond, Inc., 509 SE.2d 307, 311-19 (Va. 1999) (same);
Etheridge v. Med. Ctr. Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525,528-34 (Vs. 1989) (same).
23. See infra Part H (discussing challenges to damage caps based on jury trial guarantees);
Part III (considering due process, equal protection, and special legislation challenges to damage
caps); Part IV (examining challenges to damage caps based on abuse of legislative preroga-
tives). Parties have attacked damage caps on theories other than the ones this Note discusses.
For example, parties have alleged that the cap on damages constitutes an illegal taking of
property. See Pulliam, 509 SEE.2d at 317-18 (rejecting Takings Clause challenge to damage
cap); cf U.S. CONST. amend. V (prohibiting taking of private property for public use without
just compensation); VA. CONST. art. , § 11 (same). Those challenges are outside the scope of
this Note, although many observations that this Note makes about the struggle between courts
and legislatures also are relevant to those challenges. Furthermore, this Note is concerned
primarily with challenges based on state constitutional law, rather than ones based on the federal
Constitution. The latter have been unsuccessful. See Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study
Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 88 (1978) (rejecting Fifth Amendment due process challenge to
federal limit on nuclear accident liability); Ferguson v. Garmon, 643 F. Supp. 335, 340 (D. Kan.
1986) (rejecting federal due process challenge to state damage cap); Fein v. Permanente Med.
Group, 695 P.2d 665, 679-82 (Cal. 1985) (sustaining damage cap), appeal dismissedfor want
ofsubstantialfederal question, 474 U.S. 892 (1985).
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mon law and the power of legislatures to change common law.24 Part III dis-
cusses challenges to caps based on equal protection, due process, and special
legislation clauses of state constitutions.' Equal protection, due process, and
special legislation analyses all rest upon rational basis review.' The Note
explores whether the courts correctly apply the relevant tests when consider-
ing the constitutionality of damage caps under these provisions.' Part IV con-
siders challenges to damage caps based on abuse of legislative prerogatives.
It examines Kansas's quid pro quo rule for abolition of common law actions'
and Ohio's jurisprudence on legislative alteration of trial court jurisdiction."
Finally, Part V of this Note concludes that the decisions upholding damage
caps against constitutional attack are better-reasoned than those rejecting the
caps.
30
i. Challenges to Damage Caps Based on Jury Trial Guarantees
One commentator has described trial by jury as the "hallmark of the Amer-
ican tort system.' 31 Lawyers challenging damage caps often have grounded
their attacks in state constitutional guarantees ofarightto a civil trial by jury. 2
This Part explores whether statutory damage caps invade the rightto ajurytrial
by analyzing the decisions that courts handed down in four representative
states: Kansas, Oregon, Maryland, and Virginia.3
24. See infra Part H (discussing right to jury-trial challenges to damage caps).
25. See infta Part i (analyzing challenges to damage caps based on due process, equal
protection, and special legislation clauses).
26. See infra notes 203-14, 259-62, and accompanying text (determining appropriate
standard of review for due process and equal protection analysis).
27. See infra notes 224-44, 266-84, and accompanying text (exploring whether damage
caps fail due process or equal protection rational basis review).
28. See infra Part IVA (exploring quid pro quo rule in Kansas).
29. See infra Part IV.B (chronicling Ohio dispute over legislative power to grant or
withhold trial court jurisdiction).
30. See infa Part V (concluding that better-reasoned decisions allow damage caps).
31. FLEMING, supra note 12, at 101. Fleming noted that unlike the United States, most
common law jurisdictions no longer use civil juries. IM
32. See KAN. CONST., BILL OF RIGTS, § 5 (providing for civil trials by jury); MD. CODE
ANN., MD. CONST.,DECL. OF RIGTS art 23 (same); OR. CONST. art. , § 17 (same); VA. CONsT.
art. I, § 11 (same); cf Lakin v. Senco Prods., Inc., 987 P.2d 463, 475 (Or. 1999) (sustaining
challenge to damage cap based on jury trial guarantee); infra Part HA (examining cases in
which courts rejected challenges to damage caps based onjury trial guarantees).
33. See infra notes 35-67 and accompanying text (discussing leading cases from Kansas,
Oregon, Maryland, and Virginia). This section analyzes whether damage caps burden or deny
the right to a civil jury trial. If damage caps burden a fundamental right like the right to a jury
trial, courts might engage in heightened scrutiny similar to that used in due process or equal
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A. Cases Rejecting Challenges to Damage Caps Based on
Jury Trial Guarantees
Several states have rejected challenges to damage caps based on the jury
trial guarantees of their respective state constitutions.' This Note examines
three such jurisdictions: Kansas, Virginia, and Maryland. Although these
states do not constitute an exhaustive list of decisions rejecting jury trial guar-
antee challenges to the caps, they are a representative sample.
In Kansas, tort reform was comprehensive and included a damage cap."
In Samsel v. Wheeler Transport Services, Inc.,36 the Kansas Supreme Court
considered the constitutionality ofthat cap. 7 The court began with an inquiry
protection analysis. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (finding that strict
scrutiny applies to classifications burdening fundamental right); Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S.
474, 486 (1935) ("[A]ny seeming curtailment of the right to a jury trial should be scrutinized
with the utmost care."); James R. Andersen, Note, Blasting the Cap: Constitutional Issues
Arisingfrom Maryland's Limitation of Noneconomic Damages in Personal Injury Claims, 16
U. BALT. L. REV. 327, 333-34 (1987) (suggesting incorrectly that Maryland Court of Appeals
will apply strict scrutiny to damage cap because it interferes with right to jury trial. Courts
generally have used rational-basis scrutiny in this analysis, however, and not heightened
scrutiny. See infra notes 203-14,259-62, and accompanying text (discussing appropriate level
of scrutiny for caps).
34. See Johnson v. St. VmcentHosp., Inc., 404 N.E.2d 585,591-93 (Ind. 1980) (rejecting
jury clause challenge to damage cap); English v. New England Med. Ctr., Inc., 541 NXE.2d 329,
331-32 (Mass. 1989) (same); infra Part HA (discussing cases from Kansas, Maryland, and
Virginia).
35. SeeKAN. STAT.ANN. § 60-19a02 (1994) (limiting noneconomic damagesto $250,000);
Samsel v. Wheeler Trans. Servs., Inc., 789 P2d 541, 544-45 (Kan. 1990) (discussing tort
reform in Kansas). In 1976, the legislature established a panel of doctors to screen medical
malpractice claims, shortened the statute of limitations, and modified the collateral source rule.
Samsel, 789 P.2d at 544. The Kansas Supreme Court struck down the modification of the
collateral source rule. See Wenling v. Med. Anesthesia Ser., PAL, 701 P.2d 939, 951 (Kan.
1985). The 1985 act again modified the collateral source rule and capped punitive damages in
medical malpractice actions. Samsel, 789 P.2d at 544. Finally, the 1986 tort reform act in-
cluded provisions making the malpractice screening panel reports admissible at trial, required
court approval of attorney fees, limited the qualifications of expert witnesses, and attempted to
cap compensatory noneconomic damages. Id. at 545.
36. 789 P.2d 541 (Kan. 1990).
37. Samsel v. Wheeler Trans. Servs., Inc., 789 P.2d 541,543-58 (Kan. 1990). InSamsel,
the United States District Court for the District of Kansas had certified the question whether
Kansas's cap on noneconomic damages violated the Kansas Bill of Rights. Id. at 543. The
Kansas Supreme Court detailed the history of tort reform in the state. AL at 544-45. Then, the
court reviewed the decisions of other states on the question of damage caps. Id. at 545-47. The
court noted that its role is to declare statutes unconstitutional only when it is clear that they
violate the constitution. Id at 550. The court determined that it is unclear whether English
common law recognized a right to ajury determination of the quantum of damages. Id. at 550-
51. However, the court found the right in state common law. Id at 551. The court also
concluded that under state common law, the jury trial right includes the right to have a jury
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into whether common law juries regularly determined damages." Professing
confusion over whether the right existed at English common law, the court
instead located the right in state common law.39 The court reasoned that
individuals have no vested interest in the common law; thus, a legislature can
abolish common law rights if it provides a substitute benefit.4" The court
found a substitute right in a statutory provision requiring a judge to enter
judgment for the amount of the cap whenever a jury returned a verdict in
excess of the cap." Thus, the court upheld the cap.42
A slightly different analysis of the jury trial guarantee swayed the Mary-
land Court of Appeals in Murphy v. Edmonds.' The scope of the tort reform
determine damages for pain and suffering. Id. at 552. Nevertheless, the court declared that the
legislature retained the power to change the common law if it provided a benefit to replace the
loss of a common law right Id. at 555. In this statute, the legislature did provide that quid pro
quo: It took away the power ofjudges to order a further remittitur after reducing a jury's over-
the-cap verdict to the amount of the cap. Id. at 557-58. Thus, the court upheld the statute
because of the legislature's power to change the common law. Id at 558.
38. Id. at550.
39. Id. at 551.
40. Id. at 555. For further discussion of Kansas's requirement that the legislature provide
a substitute remedy for abolished common law actions, see infra Part IV
41. Samsel, 789 P.2d at 557-58. Because of the requirement, devices like remittitur are
unavailable when a jury returns a verdict in excess of the cap. Id. at 558. Under remittitur, a
plaintiff allows ajudge to enter judgment on an amount less than ajury verdict in exchange for
the judge's denial of the defendant's motion for a new trial. See BLACK's LAW DICIONARY
1298 (7th ed. 1999) (defining remittitur).
42. Samsel, 789 P.2d at 558.
43. Murphy v. Edmonds, 601 A.2d 102 (Md. 1992). InMurphy, the plaintiffwas injured
after a tractor trailer suffered a tire blowout and struck her car. Id. at 104-05. The plaintiff and
her husband sued the driver of the tractor trailer and his employer. Id. The jury returned a
verdict in excess of the statutory damage cap. Id. at 105. The trial court, believing that the cap
violated the equal protection clause of the Maryland Constitution, entered judgment on the
verdict. Id. at 105-06. The Maryland Court of Special Appeals reversed. Id. at 106. The
Maryland Court of Appeals found the statute constitutional. Id. at 118. Reviewing the equal
protection claim, the court found that the Maryland equal protection clause was identical in
meaning to the federal clause. Id. at 108. The appellants alleged that the cap created a classifi-
cation between slightly injured victims and severely injured victims. Id. The court found that
the classification warranted only rational basis scrutiny because tort victims are not a suspect
class. Id. at 111-12. Furthermore, heightened scrutiny was unwarranted on the grounds that
the cap burdened a fundamental right. Id at 113-14. Applying the rational basis test, the court
found that the cap was rationally related to a legitimate state purpose, thus, it did not violate the
equal protection guarantee. Id at 114-16. Turning to the jury trial guarantee challenge, the
court reasoned that the Maryland General Assembly had utilized its power over the common law
to abolish causes of action for damages exceeding the statutory cap. Id. at 116. Abolishing an
action did not interfere with the right to a jury trial because the right to a jury trial guarantees
only that those issues of fact determined in a judicial proceeding will be determined by a jury.
Id. at 116-17. When no cause of action exists the issue is not determinable in a judicial pro-
ceeding, and the right to a jury trial does not apply. Id. The court also adopted the splitting
DAMAGE CAPS AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS
effort in Maryland was smaller than in other states, but the legislature did
enact a cap on noneconomic damages.' In Murphy, the plaintiffs challenged
the cap under the state constitution."
In ruling on the damage cap, the Murphy court focused on the power of
legislatures to change the common law and reasoned that the Maryland legis-
lature simply had abolished causes of action for amounts in excess of the
damage cap. 6 The Maryland Court of Appeals also concluded that the
damage cap did not interfere with the jury's ability to assess how much
damage the plaintiff suffered, and therefore did not violate the constitution.47
Under the cap, the jury freely determines damages as part of its function to
find the facts; for instance, the jury might find that a plaintiff suffered non-
economic damages in the amount of $600,000. The law says that when a
person suffers damages in an amount greater than $500,000, that person can
recover only $500,000."' When a jury finds that a plaintiff suffered non-
economic damages in an amount greater than $500,000, a judge applies the
law to the facts as the jury found them, determines that the law permits
recovery for $500,000, and enters judgment for that amount.5" No constitu-
tional violation occurs because the jury retains its right to assess whether and
how much the plaintiff has sufibred; a judge then determines the legal conse-
quences of the facts the jury finds." Following this reasoning, the Murphy
court upheld the statutes against the challenge.52 This Note refers to this
theory to explain its decision. Id. at 117; see also infra notes 47-53,108-18, and accompanying
text (explaining splitting theory). Therefore, the court upheld the statute. Murphy, 601 A.2d
at 118. Finally, the court determined that the evidence of gross negligence in the case was
insufficient to support an award of punitive damages. Id.at 118-19.
44. SeeAct ofMay27,1986, ch. 639,1986 Md. Laws2348 (codified at MD.ANN. CODE.,
CTS. & JUD. PROC. §§ 10-913, 11-108, & 11-109) (enacting tort reform in Maryland). That bill
included only a cap on noneconomic damages and a provision requiring periodic payment of
judgments. Id.
45. Murphy, 601 A.2d at 107.
46. See id. at 116-17 (reasoning that General Assembly in essence abolished actions for
damages in excess of cap).
47. See id. at 117 (finding that ability ofjury to deliver verdict is unchanged); infa notes
108-18 and accompanying text (analyzing theory that damage caps are constitutional because
jury can still deliver verdict).
48. See Murphy, 601 A.2d at 117 (finding that damage cap does not limit jury's role).
49. See MD. CODE ANN., CTs. & JUD. PRoc. § 11-108 (Mlchie 1998) (limiting non-
economic damages to $500,000).
50. Cf Murphy, 601 A.2d at 117 ("No question exists concerning the role of the judge
versus the jury with respect to noneconomic tort damages [in excess of the cap]."). Thus, the
Murphy court found that the jury trial guarantee was not implicated. Id
51. See id. (determining that cap does not interfere with jury's ability to resolve pertinent
factual issues).
52. Id.at118.
58 WASH. &LEEL. REV 315 (2001)
analysis distinguishing the roles ofjudge and jury as the "splitting theory" and
explores it in greater detail below.
53
The Virginia Supreme Court employed similar reasoning in Etheridge v.
Medical Center Hospitals.5 4 The Virginia reform statute targeted medical
malpractice claims only and included a cap on all damages, economic and
noneconomic, in medical malpractice cases.5:5 Adjudicating a jury guarantee
challenge to the cap, the Etheridge court focused on the meaning of a common
law jury verdict. 6 The court found that although a party had a right at com-
mon law to a jury determination of the facts of a case, nothing required the
court automatically to enter final judgment in favor of the party prevailing
with the jury. 7 By writing substantive law, the legislature could determine
53. See infra notes 108-18 and accompanying text (discussing splitting theory).
54. Etheridge v. Med. Ctr. Hosps., 376 S.E2d 525 (Va. 1989). InEtheridge, the plaintiff
had undergone surgery to remove a deteriorating jawbone. Id. at 526. She emerged from the
surgery severely brain damaged and permanently paralyzed. Id. at 527. The jury returned a
verdict for $2,750,000; the trial court entered judgment for $750,000, the amount of the cap. Id.
The plaintiff contended that the cap violated several provisions of the Virginia constitution. Id.
The Virginia Supreme Court found that the cap did not violate the right to trial by jury because
no constitutional right to judgment on ajury verdict existed. Id. at 529. The court adopted the
splitting theory, reasoning that once ajury determined the quantum of damages, its constitutional
role is filfilled. Id. The plaintiff also raised a procedural due process challenge to the cap,
claiming that it created an irrebuttable presumption that her damages did not exceed the amount
of the cap. Id. at 529-31. The court rejected the procedural due process claim, however, because
the cap did not deny to the plaintiff "reasonable notice and a meaningful opportunity to be
heard." Id at 531. The court additionally rejected a substantive due process claim, finding that
an individual has no fundamental right to full recovery in tort. Id. The court held that the cap
did not violate the separation of powers provisions of the Virginia constitution because the
legislature has the power to change the common law and to set the jurisdiction of Virginia trial
courts. Id. at 532. The plaintiffs alleged that the cap violated the Virginia constitution's
provision against special legislation in that it applied only to medical malpractice claims and not
to all tort claims. Id. The court rejected this challenge as well because the classification was "'a
reasonable and notan arbitrary one.'" Id. at 533. Furthermore, the classification bore a "reason-
able and substantial relation" to the legitimate state goal of reducing costs to doctors. Id. The
court rejected an equal protection challenge on similar reasoning. Id. at 534. Thus, the court
upheld the cap. The court also found that under the cap a plaintiff could receive only $750,000
per action, not $750,000 per doctor named as a defendant Id. at 534-35. Finally, the court
determined that charitable immunity limited the liability of a charitable hospital to an amount
lowerthan the cap. Id. at 535.
55. See Act of April 9, 1976, ch. 611, 1976 Va. Acts 784 (codified as amended at VA.
CODE. ANN. 8.01-581.15 (Michie 2000)) (capping noneconomic damages in medical malprac-
tice actions). The act also included a provision establishing screening panels of doctors and
lawyers to review medical malpractice claims before parties could file them in court Id. The
Virginia act is narrow in scope compared to other acts that apply to all actions rather than just
medical malpractice ones and that include more reform provisions. Cf supra note 16 (outlining
Ohio tort reform law).
56. See Etheridge, 376 S.E.2d at 529 (finding no common law right to judgment on jury
verdict).
57. See id. (discussing common law procedures by which court might nullfy jury verdict).
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the effect of the facts that a jury finds and could prevent a plaintiff from
recovering the full amount of the verdict."' Ten years later, in Pulliam v.
Coastal Emergency Services,59 the Virginia Supreme Court again upheld the
cap on reasoning similar to that of Etheridge.'
B. Cases Upholding Challenges to Damage Caps Based on
Jury Trial Guarantees
The Oregon Supreme Court voided Oregon's damage cap in Lakin v.
Senco Products, Inc. ' The court found that the Oregon Constitution guaran-
58. See id. (adopting splitting theory); see also notes 108-18 and accompanying text
(explaining splitting theory).
59. 509 S.E.2d 307 (Va. 1999).
60. See Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Servs. of Richmond, Inc., 509 S.E.2d 307, 314
(Va. 1999) ("It is not the role of the jury but of the legislature to determine the legal conse-
quences of the jury's factual findings."). In Pulliam, the plaintiff had gone to the hospital
emergency room complaining of aching legs, but was released. Id. at 311. She returned to the
emergency room the next day complaining of general weakness; later that day, she died in the
hospital. Id. An autopsy revealed that she died of bacterial pneumonia. Id. The jury returned
a verdict for the plaintiff's estate in the amount of $2,045,000; the trial court, applying the cap,
entered judgment for the plaintiff for $1,000,000. Ial at 310. On appeal, the plaintiff's estate
argued that Etheridge was decided wrongly and that the cap on damages was unconstitutional.
IM at 311-12. The court determined that under the cap, the jury was able to determine the
quantum of damages. Id. at 312. However, the court reaffirmed that it is the role of the legis-
lature to prescribe the consequences of the jury's factual findings. Id. at 314. Furthermore, the
court stated that the legislature can abolish a cause of action or extinguish it with a statute of
limitations without violating the jury trial guarantee. Id. The court found that such powers are
logically consistent with the power to limit a recovery. Md Regarding the plaintiff's special
legislation challenge, the court found that any classifications the cap created were reasonable
and bore a reasonable and substantial relation to the object of the legislation. Id. at 317. The
plaintiff alleged that the cap resulted in a taking of property in violation of the Takings Clause
of the United States Constitution. Id. at 317-18; cf U.S. CoNsT. amend. V (prohibiting state
taking of private property without just compensation). The court rejected the challenge, finding
that the plaintiff did not have a vested interest in the rules of law underlying a particular claim
until that claim accrued; thus, the damage cap was permissible because it was not retroactive.
Pulliam, 509 S.E.2d at 317-18. The plaintiff alleged substantive due process and equal
protection claims; the court rejected these because the cap had a reasonable relation to a proper
purpose and was neither arbitrary nor discriminatory. IM at 318. The court also rejected claims
based on separation of powers, deciding that under the Virginia Constitution the legislature has
power to determine the jurisdiction and rules of Virginia courts. Id. at 319. Additionally, the
court held that the cap applied to the defendant corporation, which provided outside doctors to
hospital emergency rooms and then billed the hospitals for the doctors' services. Id. at 319-20.
Finally, the court determined that the cap prevented the recovery of prejudgment interest from
the date of the plaintiff's death. Ia at 320-21.
61. Lakin v. Senco Prods., Inc., 987 P.2d 463, 475 (Or. 1999). In Lakin, a nail gun
manufactured by the defendant misfired and penetrated the plaintiff's brain. Id. at 467. The
plaintiff suffered permanent brain damage that rendered him an invalid. Id. He and his wife
filed claims for both negligence and strict products liability. Id at 466. The jury returned a
verdict for $3,323,413 in economic damages, $2,000,000 in noneconomic damages, and
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tees the right to ajury trial in all cases cognizable at common law.62 The court
also found that one common law function of a jury was to assess damages.63
Thus, the court reasoned that the Oregon Constitution guarantees the right to
have a jury assess a party's damages in common law actions.' The court
rejected the splitting theory, arguing that it eviscerated the common law
understanding of the right to trial by jury.65 Therefore, the court invalidated
the damages cap.'s Other courts have applied similar reasoning to strike down
damage caps using jury trial guante.
6 7
C. Analysis of the Challenges
The Seventh Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees
that "[i]n suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed
twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved."6 The Supreme
Court has recognized that the right to a civil jury trial in federal courts exists
both in causes of action cognizable at common law and in those statutory
causes of action that are "analogous" to those cognizable in English law
courts.69 Significantly, the English right was not absolute; it did not extend
to causes of action similar to those tried in courts of equity or admiralty.7°
$4,000,000 in punitive damages. Id. Applying Oregon's damage cap, the trial court entered
judgment for each plaintiff for only $500,000 in noneconomic damages. Id. The Oregon
Supreme Court found that the Oregon Constitution guarantees the right to ajury trial in all cases
cognizable at common law. Ida at 468. The court also found that it was the common law
function of a jury to assess damages; thus, the court reasoned, the Oregon Constitution guaran-
tees the right to have a jury assess a party's damages in common law actions. Id. at 470. The
court rejected arguments by the defendant that legislative power to alter the common law saved
the statute, reasoning that legislative alterations to the common law must themselves conform
to the state constitution. Id. at 473. Thus, the court struck down the cap. Id. at 475.
62. Id. at 468; see also OR. CONST. art. I, § 17 ("In all civil cases the right of Trial by Jury
shall remain inviolate."). Many states define the scope of their jury trial guarantees using the
common law. See infra notes 68-76 and accompanying text (discussing common law underpin-
nings ofjury trial guarantee).
63. Lakin, 987 P.2d at 470; cf infra notes 68-76 and accompanying text (finding assess-
ment of damages a common law jury function).
64. Lakin, 987 P.2d at470.
65. See iL at473-74 (rejecting splitting theory). But cf. infra notes 108-18 and accompa-
nying text (discussing logic behind splitting theory).
66. Lakin, 987 P.2d at475.
67. See Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So. 2d 156, 159-65 (Ala. 1991) (striking
down damage cap because of state jury trial guarantee); Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d
711,723 (Wash. 1989) (same).
68. U.S. CoNsT. amend. VIL
69. See Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340,348 (1998) (defining
reach of Seventh Amendment (citing Granflnanciera, SA v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33,42 (1989)).
70. See id. at 348 (reporting lack ofjury trial rights in equity and admiralty proceedings).
The Supreme Court has recognized this distinction since the early days of the Republic. See
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The Supreme Court has not utilized the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment to apply the Seventh Amendmentto the states. 71 Thus, state
constitutions are the sole source of civil jury trial rights in state court proceed-
ings. 2 The language of these state provisions varies somewhat.73 Neverthe-
less, courts in all four states mentioned above echoed the federal interpretation
whether they ultimately upheld or struck down the cap.74 They all agreed on
the common law underpinnings of the jury trial guarantees and found that the
clauses guaranteed jury trials only in actions cognizable at common law at the
time the state adopted its constitution. 7' However, they disagreed on the scope
of that right.76 Because the common law defines the scope ofjury trial guaran-
tees, it is appropriate to inquire whether, at common law, the assessment of
damages was a function of the jury.
1. Common Law Juries and Damage Assessments
The great weight of commentators, early case law, federal precedent, and
state court decisions reflect that common law juries regularly assessed dam-
ages." According to Sir William Blackstone, the quintessential authority on
Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 446-47 (1830) (distinguishing legal and equitable
proceedings in Seventh Amendment analysis).
71. See Letendre v. Fugate, 701 F.2d 1093, 1094 (4th Cir. 1983) (finding that Seventh
Amendment does not apply to states through Fourteenth Amendment).
72. See Boyd v. Bulala, 672 F. Supp. 915, 921 (W.D. Va. 1987) ("State court proceedings
are not governed by the seventh amendment, but by corresponding provisions in state constitu-
tions"), rev'd on other grounds, 877 F.2d 1191 (4th Cir. 1989).
73. Compare MD. CODE ANN., CONST., DECL. OF RIGHTS, art. 23 ("The right of trial by
jury [in civil cases] ... shall be inviolably preserved."), and OR. CONST. art I, § 17 ("In all civil
cases the right of Trial by Jury shall remain inviolate."), and KAN. CONsT., BILL OF RIGHTs, § 5
("The right of trial by jury shall be inviolate."), with VA. CONST. art I, § 11 ("That in controver-
sies respecting property, and in suits between man and man, trial by jury is preferable to any
other, and ought to be held sacred."). The Oregon Supreme Court attempted to distinguish its
decision striking down the Oregon damage cap from the V'ginia opinion upholding damage
caps by pointing to the difference in this language. See Lakin v. Senco Prods., Inc., 987 P.2d
463,473 n.10 (Or. 1999). Nevertheless, because courts interpret the clauses similarly regardless
of their language, see infra note 75 and accompanying text (reporting similar interpretations of
clauses), it is hard to see how the difference in the text is material to the damage cap issue.
74. See supra notes 68-72 and accompanying text (analyzing right to jury trial in federal
courts).
75. See Swarz v. Ramala, 66 P. 649,650 (Kan, 1901) (finding right to trial byjury in cases
cognizable at common law when state constitution was adopted); Knee v. Balt. City Passenger
Ry. Co., 40 A. 890,891 (Md. 1898) (same); State v. 1920 Studebaker Touring Car, 251 P. 701,
703 (Or. 1926) (same); W.S. Forbes & Co. v. S. Cotton Oil Co., 108 S.E. 15, 21 (Va. 1921)
(same).
76. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text (listing cases striking down and up-
holding damage caps).
77. See infra Part ll.C.1 (exploring role of common lawjury in damage assessment). The
common law is the "the embodiment of broad and comprehensive unwritten principles, inspired
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English common law, a determination of the quantum of damages a party
suffers "cannot be done without the intervention of a jury.""5 Even when a
defendant admits liability, the court must call a jury to assess damages. 9 A
nineteenth century commentator, Theodore Sedgwick, wrote that the amount
of damages "being in most cases intimately blended with the questions of fact,
must have been from the outset generally left with the jury.""° Modem
commentators agree.
81
From early English cases through recent federal opinions, courts consis-
tently have supported allowing the jury to determine damages. For example,
in an early English case, the court commented that "by the law the jury are the
judges of the damages."' In a recent case, the United States Supreme Court
by natural reason and an innate sense of justice, and adopted by common consent for the
regulation and government of the affairs of men." Samsel v. Wheeler Trans. Servs., Inc., 789
P.2d 541,550 (Kan. 1990) (citing 15A AM, JUR. 2D Common Law § 1 (1976)). It consists of
judicial decisions and practice, rather than statutes. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 270 (7th
ed. 1999) (defining "common law"). The American colonists inherited the English common law
precedent existing at the time of this country's founding, see 15AAM. JUR. 2D Common Law
§ 4 (reporting transfer of English common law to American courts), and it is this early precedent
that is most relevant to jury trial guarantees. Cf. Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc.,
523 U.S. 340, 348 (1998) (finding that historical common law defines scope of jury trial
guarantee (citing Granfinanciera, SA v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33,42 (1989)). However, because
no authority explicitly states the rules of the historical common law, one must consult a variety
of sources when attempting to determine its content Samsel, 789 P.2d at 550. Evidence for
what the common law was at a given time includes the works of contemporary common law
commentators, judicial decisions of common law courts in England and the United States, and
modem judicial opinions that express a sense of what the common law was. Cf Samsel, 789
P.2d at 550 (commenting that courts sometimes look to English practice to determine common
law at given time).
78. 3 WIIAMBLACKSTONE, COMM-NARIES *397.
79. See id. at *398 (opining thatjury is necessary to assess damages).
80. 1TIHEODORE SEDGWICK, A TREATISE ONTIE MEASuRE oFDAMAGEs, § 19, at20
(New York, Baker Voorhis, 8th ed. 1891); 1 J.G. SUTHMRLND, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF
DAMAGES § 2 (Chicago, Callaghan 1884) (stating that jury determines damages as matter of
fact). The time Sedgwick wrote is important because states claim to look to the common law
at the time they adopted their constitution to determine the appropriate interpretation. See Lakin
v. Senco Prods., Inc., 987 P.2d 463, 468 (Or. 1999) (finding that parameters of right were set
when state adopted constitution); Etheridge v. Med. Ctr. Hosps., 376 S.El2d 525, 528 (Va.
1989) (same). Nevertheless, the opinions do not seem concerned with differentiating the
common law in 1857, when Oregon adopted its constitution, Lakin, 987 P.2d at 468, from the
common law in 1776, when Vrginia adopted its constitution, Etheridge, 376 S.E.2d at 529.
81. See I JEROME H. NATES ET AL, DAMAGES IN TORT ACTIONS § 1.04(1Xa) (1999)
(stating that assessment of damages is jury function); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 328C (1965) (allowing jury to determine amount of plaintiff's compensation for "legally
compensable harm").
82. Townsend v. Hughes, 86 Eng. Rep. 994, 995 (C.P. 1677). In Townsend, the defen-
dant allegedly said that the plaintiff was "an unworthy man, and acts against law and reason."
Id. at 994. The plaintiff brought an action for slander, and the jury awarded him 14000. Id.
328
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stated that the Seventh Amendment precluded the court from independently
assessing damages in an action at law.s The Court found "overwhelming
evidence that the consistent practice at common law was for juries to award
damages.u
84
State courts have reached similar conclusions about the common law.
Early cases from the states in question show juries assessing damages in tort
actions."5 Modem cases agree. For example, the Virginia Supreme Court
found that "[w]ithout question, the jury's fact finding function extends to the
assessment of damages.""6 The Oregon Supreme Court reached the same
conclusion." The Kansas Supreme Court misread federal precedent as stating
that damage-finding was not a jury function at English common law, yet
proceeded to find that right under Kansas common law.88 It is evident that
One juror confessed afterwards that the jury had made the verdict so high in order that the
plaintiff "might have the greater opportunity to show himself noble in the remitting of [the
damages]." Id. The defendant asked for a new trial. Id. With one justice dissenting, the court
denied his appeal and declined to inquire into a jury's reasoning when awarding damages. Ma
Other English cases also involved juries awarding damages. See Feltner v. Columbia Pictures
Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 353 (1998) (listing English cases in which juries awarded
damages).
83. See Feltner, 523 U.S. at 353-55 (finding that SeventhAmendment requiresjury deter-
mination of damages). In Feltner, the judge had determined the quantum of damages in a
copyright infringement action, rather than allowing the jury to pass on the question. Id. at 344.
84. Id. at 353. Older Supreme Court precedent is in agreement See id. at 352 (listing
previous federal cases in which jury awarded damages); Hetzel v. Prince Wiliam County, 523
U.S. 208,211-12 (1998) (per curiam) (finding Seventh Amendment right to jury determination
of damages); Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486 (1935) (determining that it is for jury to
"determine... the extent of the injury by an assessment of damages").
85. See, e.g., Hefley v. Baker, 19 Kan. 9,12 (1877) (recording jury's finding of damages
in trespass action); Marshall v. Addison, 4 H. & McH. 352,353 (Md. 1773) (recording jury's
assessment of damages in slander action); Cooke v. Thornton, 27 Va. (6 Rand.) 8, 8 (1824)
(reporting jury instruction on finding damages in negligence action).
86. Etheridge v. Md. Ctr. Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525,529 (Va. 1989); see also O'Brien v.
Snow, 210 S.E2d 165,167 (Va. 1974) (finding right to trial by jury on punitive damage claim).
87. See Lakin v. Senco Prods., Inc., 987 P.2d 463, 470 (Or. 1999) (concluding that
assessment of damage is function of common lawjury).
88. See Samsel v. Wheeler Trans. Servs., Inc., 789 P.2d 541,550-51 (Kan. 1990) (finding
that United States Supreme Court concluded no common law right exists to jury determination
of damages and locating right in Kansas common law). The Samsel court cited Tull v. United
States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987), for the proposition that the common law jury right did not extend
to damages. Samsel, 789 P.2d at 550-51. In Tull, the Supreme Court considered a defendant's
contention that he was entitled to a jury trial on his alleged violations of the Clean Water Act.
Tull, 481 U.S. at 414. The Tull Court found that civil penalty suits under the Clean Water Act
were analogous to actions in debt and therefore required a jury for a determination of liability.
Id. at 420. Nevertheless, the jury role did not extend to determining the amount of the civil
penalty under the Act because a civil penalty is not a "fundamental elemen[t]" of a jury trial.
Id. at 426. The Kansas Supreme Court in Samsel apparently failed to anticipate the distinction
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common law juries, which form the basis of jury trial guarantees in state
constitutions, regularly assessed damages.
2. Common Law Verdicts and Common Law Judgments
Determining whether damage caps violate jury trial guarantees requires
an examination ofthe distinct functions ofjury and judge. A jury is responsi-
ble for making findings of fact and for rendering a verdict.,9 A judge is re-
sponsible for applying the law and for entering ajudgment. A proper under-
standing of that relationship clarifies the constitutional jury right in two ways.
First, under the common law, a party never had a right to judgment solely on
the basis of a jury verdict; thus, damage caps do not interfere with the right to
a jury trial.91 Second, using the "splitting theory," courts can conceptualize
damage caps in a way that they do not interfere with the functions of a jury.2
a. Review ofJury Verdicts at Common Law
No right existed at common law to judgment on a jury's assessment of
damages.9' The jury's assessment always was subject to controls."' Black-
stone himself contemplated several instances in which a court need not enter
judgment on the jury's verdict. He commented that "new trials are every day
awarded" when a jury's verdicts are "given without, or contrary to, evi-
dence."' He noted that "[i]f every verdict was final in the first instance, it
between a civil penalty, which is similar to a criminal sentence, and damages in tort, which a
jury historically has assessed. See Feltner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340,
354-55 (1998) (distinguishing tort damages from civil penalty). The United States Supreme
Court clearly has concluded that damages assessment was a function of the common law jury.
Id. at 355.
89. See infra notes 108-18 and accompanying text (distinguishing functions ofjudge and
jury).
90. See infra notes 108-18 and accompanying text (contrasting role ofjudge with that of
jury).
91. See infra notes 93-107 and accompanying text (discussing absence of common law
right to judgment on jury verdict).
92. See supra notes 47-53 and accompanying text (discussing splitting theory); infra notes
108-18 and accompanying text (same).
93. See 3 BLACKSTONF, supra note 78, at *389 ("Our ancestors saw that [a jury verdict]
ought not finally to conclude the question in the first instance"); id. at *387 (commenting that
court can set aside verdict in certain circumstances).
94. See id. at *387 (referring to ancient "superintendent powers" of courts over juries and
stating that court can prevent jury from acting contrary to evidence by granting new trial).
95. Id. at *375 (emphasis in original); see also id. at *387 (noting that court may set aside
verdict ifjury has acted "without or contrary to evidence"). Blackstone contrasted this practice,
current in his day, with the more ancient practice of giving effect to jury verdicts even in the
absence of evidence. IM Originally, a jury consisted of men with personal knowledge of the
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would tend to destroy this valuable method of trial."96 Of particular signifi-
cance to the topic of damage caps, Blackstone cited an early case in which a
judge ordered a new trial in a slander action because the jury returned exces-
sive damages.'
Judicial opinions in this country reflect similar controls on the jury.
From the very beginning, federal courts acknowledged the power of the jury
to find facts, yet were willing to set aside jury verdicts that were not in confor-
mity with the law' or that were grossly excessive.9 Furthermore, the United
States Supreme Court has decided that in cases involving punitive damage
verdicts, the Due Process Clause not only allows but also requires some form
ofjudicial review as to the quantum of damages."c°
State courts also recognize controls on jury verdicts. For instance, the
Virginia Supreme Court determined that if no disputed facts remain after
presentation of the case, "the jury [is] not empowered to give specific legal
effect to its decisions." ' The Maryland Court of Appeals found that the
practice ofremittitur1 2 "was not unknown" when Maryland adopted its consti-
facts at issue; thus, it was logical to allow them to deliver a verdict based on personal knowl-
edge rather than on testimony. Id. Of course, modem courts do not follow every admonition
from Blackstone. Nevertheless, his jurisprudence might produce fewer hung juries. He reports
that the jurors were kept "without meat, drink, fire or candle" until they agreed. Id. at *375.
If they did not agree by the lime the judge left town, he might carry them around in a cart with
him until they returned a verdict Id. at *376.
96. Id. at *390.
97. Ik at *388 (citing Wood v. Gunston, 82 Eng. Rep 867 (K.B. 1655)); see also Wood,
82 Eng. Rep. at 867 (setting aside jury verdict on grounds that it was excessive). In Wood, an
action for slander, the jury had awarded £1500. Id. Chief Justice Glyn commented that "it is
frequent in our books for the Court to take notice of miscariages [sic] ofjuries, and to grant new
tryals [sic] upon them." Id. (emphasis added).
98. See Walker v. Smith, 29 F. Cas. 56,56 (C.C.D. Pa. 1804) (No. 17,087) (commenting
on willingness to set aside verdict not in conformity with jury charge).
99. See Whipple v. Cumberland Mfg. Co., 29 F. Cas. 934,938 (C.C.D. Me. 1843) (No.
17,516) (Story, 3.) (stating that court will set aside verdict for excessive damages under certain
circumstances).
100. See Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415,435 (1994) (declaring unconstitutional
Oregon's attempt to eliminate judicial review of punitive damage awards).
101. Etheridge v. Med. Ctr. Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525, 529 (Va. 1989) (citing Edith Guild
Henderson, The Background of the Seventh Amendment, 80 HARV. L. REV. 289, 305-06
(1966)). For a complete discussion of the many methods of controlling or avoiding juries in the
eighteenth century, see Henderson, supra, at 299-320.
102. SeeBLACK's LAWDICrONARY 1298(7th ed. 1999) (defining "remittitur"). Aremit-
titur occurs when a jury verdict seems excessive to a court, and the judge requests a party to
accept judgment for a smaller amount as a condition for denying the other party's motion for
a new trial. Id. Some courts have suggested that the permissibility of remittitur is not relevant
to the issue of damage caps because a remittitur can occur only with the plaintiff's consent, and
a damage cap takes effect without the plaintiff's consent See Lakin v. Seno Prods., Inc., 987
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tution. °a The Maryland Court ofAppeals also acknowledged the power to set
aside a verdict on the grounds that the verdict was against the weight of the
evidence."' Even in Oregon, where a 1910 constitutional amendment severely
limits judicial control ofjuries, 5 a court need not enter judgment on a verdict
if no evidence supports it."° Both historical and modem case law reflect that
the historical common law and, thus, the constitutional provisions that the
common law defines, never recognized a right to judgment on ajury verdict. °7
b. The "Splitting Theory"
Several state courts have adopted what this Note refers to as the "splitting
theory" to explain their decisions to uphold damage caps."ca An ancientmaxim states that "[t]he judges answer questions of law; the jurors, ones
of fact.""°  These proper, traditional functions of judge and jury are the key
P.2d 463, 471 (Or. 1999). Nevertheless, no right to judgment on the verdict exists because a
court might still order a new trial without the plaintiff's consent. Theoretically, a court might
order new trials indefinitely. See SThvEN C. YEAZEL, CIV[L PROCEDURE 739 (1996) (com-
menting on theoretical possibility that court might continuously order new trials).
103. Turner v. Wash. Suburban Planning Comm'n, 158 A.2d 125,130 (Md. 1960).
104. See id. (acknowledging power to set aside verdict contrary to evidence).
105. See OR. CONST. art. VII (amended), § 3 (prohibiting reexamination of jury verdict
unless no evidence supports it); Lakin, 987 P.2d at 471 (citing 1910 constitutional amendment
that eliminated power of court to set aside verdict on ground that it is excessive). The United
States Supreme Court has held this provision of the Oregon Constitution unconstitutional under
the federal Constitution as applied to punitive damages. See Honda Motor Co., 512 U.S. at 435
(finding provision unconstitutional in punitive damages case). For additional discussion of the
implications of the provision, which ultimately should not prohibit the enactment of a damage
cap, see infra notes 122-32 and accompanying text
106. OR. CONST. art. VII (amended), § 3 (prohibiting reexamination of jury-determined
facts "unless there is no evidence to support the verdict") (emphasis added).
107. But cf 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 78, at *379 (opining that trial by jury is "the glory
of the English law"). The reader should not interpret this Note's conclusion that no right to
judgment on ajury verdict existed at common law in a way that would allow a court completely
to disregard a jury's findings of fact, something that even the ancients considered improper. Cf
2 MARCUS TUL.TLus CICERo, ACTIONIS SECUNDAE IN C. VEnnEM, § 31 (n.d.) (worrying that
corrupt judge automatically will enter judgment against party that jury favors). A jury's factual
conclusions, supported by appropriate evidence, should bind a judge as he determines a remedy
by applying them to the substantive law. See infra notes 108-18 and accompanying text (de-
scribing splitting theory).
108. See Murphy v. Edmonds, 601 A-2d 102,117 (Md. 1992) (implicitly adopting splitting
theory); Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Servs. of Richmond, Inc., 509 S.E.2d 307,312-15 (Va.
1999) (reaffirming splitting theory adopted originally in Etheridge); Etheridge v. Med. Ctr.
Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525, 529 (Va. 1989) (adopting splitting theory). But see Lakin v. Senco
Prods., Inc., 987 P.2d 463,473-74 (Or. 1999) (rejecting splitting theory).
109. 1 SEDGWICK, supra note 80, § 18, at 20 ("[A]d questiones legis resp ondentijudices;
ad questionesfactijuratores.").
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to understanding the relationship between damage caps and the jury guar-
antee. 10
Underthe splitting theory's conception of damage caps, the judge and the
jury serve unique roles, and the damage caps do not impair the jury function.1"'
The jury finds as a matter of fact that the plaintiff has been damaged in the
amount ofXdollars, an amount which may be above the statutory damage cap
for that jurisdiction. This verdict satisfies the common law right to a jury
determination of the quantum of damages." 2 Thus, the finding fulfills the
"constitutional mandate" of the jury function." 3 The judge then takes the fact
found by the jury - the quantum of damages - and applies the substantive law
of the jurisdiction, which caps the damages, to that fact. Applying the law to
the fact, the court determines what amount the law permits a plaintiff to re-
cover for the damages the jury verdict recognized and then enters judgment for
that amount.114 Bothjudge and jury performtheir functions, yetthe legal effect
of the facts that the jury found remains under the control of the court."5
A jury is not a roving judgment-producing machine; it is a fact-finding
body that exercises its function within the parameters of the law. The com-
mon law clearly recognized that principle." 6 Blackstone observed that "if,
110. Cf. Bait. & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 657 (1935) (interpreting
Seventh Amendment to "retain the common-law distinction between the province of the court
and that ofthejury"). Justice van Devanter noted that under the amendment, issues of law were
for the court and issues of fact were for the jury. Id.
111. See Etheridge, 376 S.E.2d at 529 (opining that damage cap does not interfere with
jury function under splitting theory).
112. See supra notes 77-88 and accompanying text (finding common law right to jury
determination of damages).
113. Etheridge, 376 S.E.2d at 529.
114. See id. (commenting on role of court in applying law to facts); cf id. ("A remedy is
a matter of law, not of fact."). One justice has suggested that the role of a judge in entering
judgment after a civil jury verdict is analogous to the role of a judge sentencing a defendant
after a verdict of guilty in a criminal trial. See Samsel v. Wheeler Trans. Servs., Inc., 789 P.2d
541, 558 (Kan. 1990) (McFarland, J., concurring) (comparing civil judgments to criminal
sentences). Furthermore, the court remedies only those damages the jury has found to exist.
Cf. Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474, 486-87 (1935) (upholding remittitur but striking down
additur). The Dimick Court reasoned that an additur, which allowed the increase of a jury
verdict that the judge thought insufficient, permitted recovery of damages that no jury ever
determined to exist. Id. A remittitur, in contrast, allowed the elimination of excess damages
and judgment on the remaining amount, in which amount a jury had found the defendant
damaged. Id. at486.
115. See Etheridge v. Med. Ctr. Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525,529 (Va. 1989) ("Thus, although
a party has the right to have a jury assess his damages, he has no right to have a jury dictate
through its award the legal consequences of its assessment"); cf. Murphy v. Edmonds, 601 A.2d
102, 117 (Md. 1992) (reasoning that jury fulfils role when jury assesses damages, even if cap
later reduces actual award to plaintiff).
116. See Bait. & Carolina Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654, 659 (1935) (mentioning
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notwithstanding the issue of fact be regularly [without corruption] decided, it
appears that the complaint was ... not actionable in itself," a court need not
enter judgment.1 7 Moreover, procedural devices like the 12(b)(6) motion
implicitly require determinations that even if the jury found all the facts the
plaintiff alleges, the law would not permit the jury to return a verdict for the
plaintiff or permit the judge to enter judgment on that verdict."'
In light of the common law, the Maryland and Virginia courts were
correct in accepting the splitting theory. In contrast, the Oregon Supreme
Court erred in rejecting the splitting theory. The court determined in Lakin
that although Oregon's damage cap allowed the jury to determine noneco-
nomic damages as a matter of fact, allowing a court applying the cap to enter
judgment on a lesser amount "prevent[ed] the jury's award from having its full
and intended effect." 119 Thus, the Lakin court decided that the splitting theory
did violence to the common law understanding of the phrase "Trial by Jury.
120
However, as discussed above, the common law recognized no right to judg-
ment on a jury verdict; a judge need not give a verdict its "full and intended
effect" when doing so would violate the substantive law of the jurisdiction.'
2 '
In Oregon, judges have less power over jury verdicts than they do in
other states,' 22 but the splitting theory still does not violate the Oregon Consti-
tution. The Oregon Constitution forbids courts from re-examining "[any] fact
tried by a jury... unless the court can affirmatively say that there is no
evidence to support the verdict."'" The Oregon Supreme Court has deter-
mined that this unusual clause, which forbids re-examination ofjury verdicts
even under common law procedures, prevents Oregon courts from ordering a
remittitur.' 4  The court's reasoning is crucial to understanding why the
common law practice of ruling on questions of law only after jury verdict determined facts, even
though this sometimes resulted in upsetting verdict).
117. 3 BLACKSTONE, supra note 78, at *387.
118. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(bX6) (allowing disnissal of complaint for failure to state cause
of action); cf Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957) ("[A] complaint should not be
dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove
no set offacts... which would entitle him to relief.") (emphasis added).
119. Lakin v. Senco Prods., Inc., 987 P.2d 463,473 (Or. 1999).
120. See id. (opining that splitting theory "eviscerates" trial by jury).
121. See supra notes 93-107 and accompanying text (finding no right to judgment on jury
verdict at common law).
122. See Lakin, 987 P.2d at 471 (discussing Oregon constitutional provision limiting judi-
cial review of jury verdicts, and commenting that it "eliminated" existing common law power
to grant new trials).
123. OR- CoNsT. art VIL § 17.
124. Compare Van Lore v. Schneiderman, 210 P.2d 461,463-65 (Or. 1949) (finding that
Oregon Constitution forbids remittiturs), and Buchannan v. Lewis A. I-icks Co., 134 P. 1191,
1192 (Or. 1913) (same), with Robinson v. Old Dominion Freight Line, Inc., 372 S.E.2d 142,
144 (Va. 1988) (finding "common-law authority" to order remittitur). The Oregon Supreme
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splitting theory passes muster even under Oregon's jury-empowering constitu-
tion. When determining whether to order a remittitur, a judge must form an
opinion (make a factual finding) on the excessiveness of a jury verdict.12 The
court must decide that the jurors were wrong - that their verdict was exces-
sive.1 26 In second-guessing the jurors, the judge invades their province by
ruling on a question of fact, and therein lies the "re-examination" that the
Oregon constitution completely forbids."V
In contrast, under the splitting theory conceptualization of damage caps,
no "re-examination" of a jury's finding of fact takes place. The judge need
not make an assessment of the jurors' decision to determine whether their
verdict is wrong or excessive. Rather, the court accepts the validity of the
jury's assessment of damages and applies the relevant law to it." In Lakin,
the jury found that the plaintiff suffered $2,000,000. in noneconomic dam-
ages. " Under the splitting theory, the court would apply the cap to that
finding and enter judgment for $500,000."3' The jury's factual determination
would stand; however, substantive law would dictate the consequences ofthat
determination.13 1 Applying the law to a fact does not constitute a re-examina-
tion of that fact because the judge's opinion about the fact does not enter into
the process. Thus, damage caps constitutionally are distinguishable from
remittiturs and the Oregon Supreme Court erred in determining that the Ore-
gon Constitution forbids them.
32
In summary, the decisions of the Kansas, Maryland, and Virginia courts
contain better reasoning than the Oregon decision. They recognize both the
Court found that, when a judge labels a verdict excessive and orders a remittitur, the action
constitutes the re-examination of ajury fact. See Von Lore, 210 P.2d at 463 (determining that
inquiry into whether verdict is excessive involves "examination of a question of fact"). The
court pointed out that, unlike Oregon's clause, other constitutional provisions prohibiting the
re-examination of facts tried by ajury exempt from their scope re-examination through common
law procedures like remittitur. Id. at 465; cf U.S. CO NST. amend. VII (allowing re-examination
of fact tried byjury according to "the rules of the common law"). Oregon's Constitution forbids
even common law re-examinations. VonLom,210P.2dat465.
125. Cf Von Lore, 210 P.2d at 462 ("This court is of the opinion that the verdict... is
excessive.") (emphasis added).
126. Cf id. at 464 (reporting that before adoption of amendment, court could set aside
verdict if it was unreasonable, outrageous, or irrational).
127. See id. (finding that passing on excessiveness of verdict is "question of fact").
128. Cf Etheridge v. Med. Ctr. Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525, 529 (Va. 1989) ("A trial court
applies the [cap] only after the jury has fulfilled its fact-finding function.").
129. Lakin v. Senco Prods., Inc., 987 P.2d 463,466 (Or. 1999).
130. See OR. REV. STAT. § 18.560(1) (1999) (capping noneconomic damages at $500,000).
131. Cf Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Ses. ofRichmond, Inc., 509 S.E.2d 307,314 (Va.
1999) ("[I]t is not the role of the jury but of the legislature to determine the legal consequences
of the jury's factual findings.").
132. Cf id. at 313 ("[R]emittitur and the cap are not equivalent").
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correct scope of the common law right to a jury trial3  and the distinction
between the judge's findings of law and the jury's findings of fact.' They
thereby correctly conclude that damage caps do not violate jury trial guaran-
tees.' 35 As one Kansas Supreme Court justice aptly put it, any other conclu-
sion "has the effect of lumping together the right to trial by jury on the ques-
tion of liability and the remedy to be afforded ff liability is established, and
then freezing the lump in a common law time warp."'3
3. Jury Trial Guarantees and Legislative Power over the Common Law
One additional consideration suggests that jury trial guarantees do not
create a right to judgment on a jury's assessment of damages in actions cogni-
zable at common law. Legislatures can abolish common law causes of action
and with them the right to ajury determination of damages in those actions.137
Conceptually, damage caps simply abolish the cause of action for damages in
an amount greater than the cap. Because a plaintiff has no right to damages,
this abolition does not interfere with jury trial guarantees.
38
Courts in Kansas, Maryland, Oregon, and Virginia all agree that the state
legislature has the power to change the common law and to abolish common
law causes of action.33 Legislatures typically have exercised this power to
abolish common law torts that no longer conform to modem social norms,
such as actions for alienation of affections and seduction. 140 Additionally,
133. See supra Part ILC.I and accompanying text (discussing scope ofjury trial guaran-
tees).
134. See supra notes 108-18 and accompanying text (analyzing splitting theory).
135. See Samsel v. Wheeler Trans. Servs., Inc., 789 P.2d 541, 558 (Kan. 1991) (rejecting
jury trial guarantee challenge to damage cap); Murphy v. Edmonds, 601 A2d 102, 118 (Md.
1992) (same); Pulliam, 509 S.E.2d at 314 (same); Etheridge v. Med. Ctr. Hosps., 376 S.E.2d
525,529 (Va. 1989) (same). Butsee Lakin v. Senco Prods., Inc., 987 P.2d 463,475 (Or. 1999)
(striking down cap).
136. Samsel, 789 P.2d at 558 (McFarland, i., concurring).
137. See infra Part MlC.3 (discussing legislative power over common law and implications
for jury trial guarantees).
138. See infra Part I.C.3 (reasoning that when legislature abolishes cause of action, it
abolishes right to jury determination of damages in action and that therefore right is not
absolute).
139. See, e.g., Samsel, 789 P.2d at 557 (recognizing legislative power to alter common
law); Branch v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 144 A. 696, 697 (Md. 1929) (same); Noonan v. City of
Portland, 88 P.2d 808, 822 (Or. 1938) (same); Howell v. Commonwealth, 46 S.E.2d 37,40 (Va.
1948) (same); see also Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 134 (1876) ("A person has no property,
no vested interest, in any rule of the common law."); 1 SMEET AL., TBE AM]mCAN LAW OF
TORTS § 1:41, at 152 (commenting that statutes may abolish common law tort remedies).
140. See MD. CoDEANN., FAM. LAw §§ 3-101 to 3-103 (Mhichie 1999) (abolishing actions
for breach of promise to many and alienation of affections unless individual is pregnant); OP_
REV. STAT. §§ 30.840 - 30.850 (1999) (abolishing actions for alienation of affections and
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legislatures abolished common law actions for negligence against employers
when they enacted workers compensation schemes. 4' Occasionally, parties
have argued that abolishing common law actions interferes with the right to
a jury trial in common law cases, but courts have rejected these arguments.
142
The Maryland Court of Appeals commented:
Mhe constitutional rightto ajury trial is concerned with whetherthe court or
the jury shall decide those issues which aretobe resolved in ajudicialproceed-
big. Where, however, the General Assembly has provided that a matter shall
not be resolved in ajudicial proceeding, by legislatively abrogating or modify-
ing a cause of action, no question concerning the right to ajury trial arises.'"
Similarly, the Washington Supreme Court, in evaluating a challenge to a
workers compensation law, found that
the rightto trialbyjury accordedbythe constitution, as applicableto civil cases,
is incident only to causes of action recognized by law .... If the power to do
away with a cause of action... exists in any case at all in the exercise of the
police power of the state, then the right of trial by jury is thereafter no longer
involved in such cases. The right ofjury trial being incidental to the right of
action, to destroythe one is to leavethe othernothingupon whichto operate.
1
4
Logically, the power to abolish causes of action aforioi includes the power
to interfere with the right to a jury trial in those actions. 4 '
criminal conversation); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-220 (Mihie 2000) (abolishing actions for alien-
ation of affections, breach of promise to marry, criminal conversation, and seduction).
141. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-501(b) (2000) (abolishing actions for compensation
other than compensation provided by act); OR. REV. STAT. § 656.018(lXa) (1999) (same); VA.
CODE ANN. § 65.2-307 (Michie 2000) (abolishing actions "at common law or otherwise' for
injuries covered under act).
142. See, e.g., Mountain Timber Co. v. Wash., 243 U.S. 219, 235 (1917) ("[Tihe act
abolishes all right of recovery ... and therefore leaves nothing to be tried by jury."); Boyd v.
Bulala, 877 F.2d 1191, 1196 (4th Cir. 1989) (finding that abolition of cause of action does not
violate Seventh Amendment); Branch v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 144 A. 696, 697 (Md. 1929)
(finding that jury trial is not required in abolished common law action); Jacobs v. Adams, 505
A.2d 930, 940 (Md. Ct Spec. App. 1986) (same); Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Servs. of
Richmond, Inc., 509 S.E.2d 307, 314 (Va. 1999) (same); State ex rel Davis-Smith Co. v.
Clausen, 117 P. 1101, 1119 (Wash. 1911) (finding that when legislature abolishes common law
action, no right to jury trial exists in that action). A review of the cases reveals no challenges
to the abolition of alienation of affections actions based on jury trial guarantees. However, in
"almost all instances," courts have upheld statues abolishing causes of action for alienation of
affections against various constitutional challenges. 7 SPEER, supra note 139, § 22.5, at 556.
143. Murphy v. Edmonds, 601 A.2d 102,116 (Md. 1992).
144. State exrelDavis-Smith Co. v. Clausen, 117 P. 1101,1119 (Wash. 1911); cf. Barnes
v. Cauthen, 510 A.2d 930, 940 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986) ("If there is no cause of action, there
is nothing to which the right of trial by jury can attach.").
145. See supra notes 137-44 and accompanying text (concluding that abolishing cause of
action does not interfere with right to jury trial).
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Two conclusions emerge from this consideration. First, the right to have
ajury assess damages in a common law action is not unlimited; legislatures can
abolish it when they abolish a cause of action." Second, damage caps simply
abolish causes of action for damages in amounts above the statutory limit; the
caps abolish the right to a jury trial with the cause of action.'47 Providing for
a judge to resolve the question of the quantum of damages would certainly
violate the jury trial guarantees, because a jury did assess damages at common
law.14 However, because the caps abolish the action for damages in excess of
the cap altogether, they do not violate jury trial guarantees.
il. The Courts as Boss: Challenges to Damage Caps Based on Equal
Protection, Due Process, and Special Legislation Clauses
The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
that no state shall "deprive any person of lifr, lberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protec-
tion of the laws."049 State constitutions contain similar provisions, and some-
times also forbid the state from passing "special legislation."'50 In Illinois,
Maryland, Ohio, and Virginia, litigants have assailed damage caps under these
provisions.' Here again, the better-reasoned decisions uphold the caps.
A. Cases Rejecting Challenges
InEtheridge v. Medical Center Hospitals,152 the Virginia Supreme Court
rejected special legislation and equal protection challenges to its damage
146. See supra notes 143-45 and accompanying text (commenting that legislature can abol-
ish right to jury trial when it abolishes cause of action).
147. See Murphy, 601 A.2d at 117 (reasoning that damage caps do not violate jury trial
guarantee because they abolish cause of action for damages in excess of cap, and with it right
to jury trial in those actions).
148. See Feitner v. Columbia Pictures Television, Inc., 523 U.S. 340, 355 (1998) (revers-
ing judge who determined quantum of damages); supra Part II.C.1 (finding it function of
common law jury to assess damages).
149. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. The United States Supreme Court has found that
damage caps do not offend the due process provision of the federal Constitution. See Duke
Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59, 182-84 (1978) (rejecting due
process challenge to federal limit on nuclear accident liability); cf Boyd v. Bulala, 877 F.2d
1191,1196-97 (4th Cir. 1989) (declining to strike down damage cap under federal Due Process
or Equal Protection Clauses).
150. For due process clauses, see ILL. CoNST. art I, § 2; M. CODE ANN., MD. CONST.,
DECL. OF RIGls §23, OHIo CONST. art. I, § 16; and VA. CONST. art. I, § 11. For equal protc-
tion clauses, see ILL CoNST. art. I, § 2; OHIo CONST. art. I, § 16; and VA. CONST. art. I, § 11.
For special legislation clauses, sce ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 13 and VA. CONST. art IV, § 14.
151. See infra notes 152-99 and accompanying text (outlining cases litigating damage caps
under due process, equal protection, and special legislation clauses).
152. 376 S.E.2d 525 (Va. 1989).
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cap. 53 In considering the special legislation challenge, the court explained that
in Virginia, a statute survives a special legislation challenge if the classifica-
tion it draws is "'a reasonable and not a arbitrary one,"' and if it "bears 'a
reasonable and substantial relation to the object sought to be accomplished by
the legislation.'"A The Etheridge court found that the cap of $750,000 in
medical malpractice actions had a substantial relationship to the goal of ensur-
ing a sufficient supply of doctors in Virginia.'55 The court further concluded
that the statute did not create a classification at all.'56 Under its equal protec-
tion analysis, the court applied a "rational basis" test to the statute, asking
whether the statute's alleged classification between slightly injured plaintiffs
and severely injured plaintiffs promoted a legitimate state purpose. 57 Finding
that it did, the court rejected the equal protection challenge. 5 '
Ten years later in Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Services ofPRchmond,
Inc.,"" the Virginia Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding inEtheridge."o The
Pulliam court also faced a substantive due process challenge to the ap.6
The court again applied a rational basis test and concluded that the statute was
rationally related to a legitimate state purpose.'62
In Murphy v. Edmonds," the Maryland Court of Appeals addressed an
equal protection challenge to its damage cap." The plaintiffs rested their
challenge to the damage cap entirely upon the theory that the court should
subject the cap to intermediate or strict scrutiny rather than rational basis
review." The court reviewed the three levels of scrutiny associated with the
153. Etheridge v. Med. Ctr. Hasps., 376 S.E.2d 525, 532-34 (Va. 1989). For a summary
of Etheridge, see supra note 54.
154. Id. at 533 (quoting Mandell v. Haddon, 121 S.E.2d 516, 525 (Va. 1961); ExParte
Settle, 77 S.E. 496,497 (Va. 1913)).
155. Etheridge, 376 S.E.2d at 533.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 534.
158. Id.
159. 509 S.E.2d 307 (Va. 1999).
160. Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Servs. of Richmond, Inc., 509 S.E.2d 307, 321 (Va.
1999). For a summary of Pulliam, see supra note 60.
161. Id. at318-19.
162. Id.
163. 601 A.2d 102 (Md. 1991).
164. See Murphy v. Edmonds, 601 A.2d 102, 107-13 (Md. 1992) (evaluating and ulti-
mately rejecting equal protection challenge to damage cap). For a summary of Murphy, see
supra note 43. Maryland's Constitution has no express equal protection clause. Murphy, 601
A.2d at 107. However, the Maryland Court ofAppeals has read an equal protection component
into the Maryland Constitution's due process clause. Id.; cf. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,
499-500 (1954) (finding equal protection component in Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause).
165. Murphy, 601 A.2d at 111.
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federal equal protection analysis, which the court declared identical with Mary-
land equal protection analysis. 166 The court found that rational basis review
was the appropriate standard.67 It then noted that the cap might create "greater
case in calculating premiums," attracting insurers into the Maryland market
and ultimately reducing premiums."6 Thus, the cap was "reasonably related
to a legitimate legislative objective" - ensuring the availability of insurance in
Maryland 69 Courts in other states have rejected similar challenges. 
70
B. Cases Upholding Challenges
The Illinois Supreme Court struck down Illinois's cap on noneconomic
damages in Best v. Taylor Machine Works.1717 The court based its conclusion
on the "special legislation" clause of the Illinois constitution, 172 Which guar-
166. Id. at 107-11; see also id. at 107 (finding that extent of Maryland equal protection
clause parallels federal Equal Protection Clause).
167. Id. at 114.
168. Id at 115.
169. Id.
170. See Fein v. Permanente Med. Group, 695 P.2d 665, 681, 682-84 (Cal. 1985) (reject-
ing due process and equal protection challenges to medical malpractice damages cap); Robinson
v. Charleston Area Med. Ctr., Inc., 414 S.E.2d 877, 886-87 (W. Va. 1992) (same).
171. Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1062-80 (1. 1997). Tort reform in
Illinois passed as part of one comprehensive act; in Best, the Illinois Supreme Court struck down
many of the provisions and declined to sever the unconstitutional ones from the others. Id. at
1105. Thus, the court struck down the entire Illinois tort reform package. Id. at 1106. The
plaintiffwas injured when operating a forklift at work and sued the manufacturer of the lift. Id.
at 1064. Before trial, Best sought a declaratory judgment that the tort reform act, including the
damage cap that would limit his recovery, was unconstitutional. Id. at 1065. The trial court
granted the motion for a declaratory judgment and struck down the act Id. The defendants
appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court Id First, the court determined that the case was ripe for
review. Id. at 1066. Then, the court decided that the cap violated the Illinois Constitution's pro-
hibition against special legislation because the legislature lacked a rational basis for the classifi-
cations it created. Id at 1075-77. The court also found that the cap, a "one-size-fits-all legisla-
tive remittitur," violated the doctrine of separation of powers. Id. at 1078-81. The court found
the provision modifying the rules through which tortfeasors could seek contributions from em-
ployers under workers compensation to be either arbitrary or superfluous and hence unconstitu-
tional. Id. at 1081-84. The act additionally had abolished joint and several liability except in
medical malpractice cases, id. at 1087; finding no rational basis for the distinction between
medical malpractice cases and other cases, the court struck down the provision, id. at 1089.
Another provision of the act made all patient records discoverable in a medical malpractice
proceeding. Id. The court declared that this provision violated separation of powers because it
interfered with the "uniquely judicial function" of "[e]valuating the relevance of discovery
requests and limiting such requests to prevent abuse orharassment" Id. at 1093. TheBestcourt
also opined that the section interfered with the right to privacy inherent in physician-patient
relationships. Id. at 1100. Because the unconstitutional provisions of the act were not severable
from the other provisions, the court voided the act in tote. Id. at 1103-04.
172. See id. at 1069; cf. ITL. CONST. art. IV, § 13 ("The General Assembly shall pass no
special or local law when a general law is or can be made applicable.").
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antees the same rights as an equal protection clause.173 The plaintiffs con-
tended that the statute created three impermissible classifications, the most
important of which was a classification distinguishing between slightly
injured and severely injured individuals. 74 The court determined that because
none of the classifications involved a suspect class, they merited review under
the rational-basis test.1 75 Under rational basis review, the classifications need
only relate rationally to a legitimate state interest. 76 The court found that the
classifications did not meet that standard because there was no relationship
between the "costs of tort liability" and the level of damages insurers paid in
tort actions.177 The court then commented that if there was a relationship,
there was no rational basis for forcing tort victims (that is to say, the people
who benefit from a defendant's tort liability) to bear the entire burden of
reducing the costs of that liability.7  Thus, it struck down the damages cap.
InMorris v. Savoy,' " the Ohio Supreme Court faced damage caps for the
first time.' Four of the seven justices concluded that the damage cap vio-
173. See Best, 689 N.E2d at 1070-71 ("A special legislation challenge generally is judged
under the same standards applicable to an equal protection challenge.").
174. Id. at 1075. The other two classifications allegedly separated between individuals
with identical injuries who suffer those injuries at different times and discriminated by kinds
of injury. Id. Elaborating on the second classification, the court explained that an individual
who loses one leg in an accident and subsequently loses the other leg in a different accident can
sue both tortfeasors and recover the full amount of the cap twice. Id. An individual who loses
both legs in the same accident, however, can recover the full amount of the cap only once. Id.
Regarding the third classification, the plaintiffs complained that the statute covered torts involv-
ing physical injury and did not affect torts, like intentional infliction of emotional distress, that
also involve noneconomic damages. Id. at 1075-76.
175. Id. at 1071. But cf Carson v. Maurer, 424 A.2d 825, 830-31 (N.H. 1980) (applying
intermediate scrutiny to cap).
176. See Best, 689 NE.2d at 1070 (stating rational basis review standard).
177. Id. at 1077.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1078.
180. 576 N.E.2d 765 (Ohio 1991).
181. Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E2d 765 (Ohio 1991). In Morris, the plaintiff had surgery
after a car accident and emerged from the surgery paralyzed fromthe neckdown. Id. at 767. The
jury returned a verdict for $2,216,000. Id. The trial court certified to the Ohio Supreme court
the question whether the law limiting recovery to $200,000 violated the Ohio Constitution. Id.
First, the court determined that because no fundamental right or suspect class was involved, the
proper standard for reviewing a damage cap is rational basis scrutiny. Id. at 769-70. Engaging
in substantive due process analysis, the court was unable to find "any evidence to buttress the
proposition that there is a rational connection between awards over $200,000 and malpractice
insurance rates." Id. at 770. The court also stated without discussion that the statute was
"unreasonable and arbitrary." Id. at 771. Therefore, it struck down the cap as unconstitutional.
Turning to an equal protection analysis, the court took note that the statute applied only to
medical malpractice actions, and therefore created a classification between medical malpractice
victims and other tort victims. Id. Nevertheless, the court found a rational basis for the distinc-
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lated the due process clause of the Ohio Constitution." Substantive due
process in Ohio requires that a statute "bear a real and substantial relation to
the public health, safety, or morals or general welfare" and that it not be
'tunreasonable or arbitrary.""83 The issue before the court was whether "any
conceivable set of facts under which the classification rationally furthered a
legitimate state objective" existed.'8 The court found no "rational connection"
between large damage awards against doctors and [high] medical malpractice
insurance rates,' and it opined that the General Assembly should explain
itself better if it wanted the next statute upheld. 86 Thus, the Morris court
struck down the cap as unconstitutional." Turning to the other challenged
portion of the statute, which partially abrogated the collateral source rule, the
court concluded that no equal protection violation existed."88 Preaching the
wisdom of judicial restraint, the court found that a rational basis existed for
treating medical malpractice victims differently than other tort victims.189
The struggle between the legislature and the court was not over. The
legislature repealed the legislationMorris had struck down and enacted a new
damage cap applyingto alltortclains, notjustto medical malpractice claims .9°
Obviously frustrated by the court, the legislature made a finding declaring that
it had a "rational and legitimate state interest" in stabilizing liability costs and
cited studies showing that damage caps would achieve that goal.' 9'
tion and rejected the equal protection analysis. IR at 772. Reviewing the second challenged part
of the statute, the court upheld the partial abrogation of the collateral source rule, and found that
it was not "unreasonable or arbitrary" to deny double recovery to a plaintiff. Id.
182. IR at 771; id. at 777 (Sweeney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
183. Id. at 769 (quoting Mominee v. Scherbarth, 503 N.E.2d 717,720-21 (Ohio 1986)).
184. Id at 770 (quoting Dznicola v. Providence Hosp., 387 N.E.2d 231,234 (Ohio 1979)).
Justice Sweeney's disagreement with the majority centered on this issue. He would have
applied strict scrutiny to the cap, reasoning that it burdened the right to a jury trial. Id. at 779-
80 (Sweeney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
185. Id. at770.
186. See id. at 771 ("Conceivably, such evidence [of the relationship between caps and
premiums] may exist, but thatwould require a second trip to the General Assembly.").
187. Id.
188. Id. at 772; see also id. at 773 (describing statute's partial abrogation of collateral
source rule).
189. See id. at 771-73 (upholding statute against equal protection attack). The statute
voided in Morris applied only to medical malpractice claims. Id at 768.
190. See State ex rel. OhioAcad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062,1091-95
(Ohio 1999) (reporting repeal of older tort reform law and enactment of new one).
191. See Act of Sept. 26, 1996, Am. Sub. HB. 350, 146 Ohio Laws 3567, 4028 (citing
state's interest in "stabilizing costs" as reason for enacting damage cap). The legislature de-
clared that damage caps would further the legitimate state interest in "stabiliz[ing] the costs of
health care delivery, manufacturing, and the delivery of services." Id. The damage cap was part
of a comprehensive tort reform bill. See id (declaring purpose to enact "changes in the laws
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The Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers filed an action in the Ohio Supreme
Court demanding a writ of prohibition enjoining Ohio trial court judges from
enforcing the new tort reform law.1" In State ex rel. Ohio Academy of Trial
Lawyers v. Sheward," the court granted the writ.194 At times, the court
seemed almost angry at the legislature; according to the court, both the court
and the legislature have "respect[ed] the integrity and independence of [each]
other, that is, until now.""19 The court accused the legislature of passing laws
to attack the judiciary as a coordinate branch ofgovernment. 96 Turning to the
damage cap question, the court again found that the cap violated substantive
pertaining to tort and other civil actions"); supra note 16 (describing provisions of 1999 Ohio
tort reform act). The act "respectfully disagree[d]" with Ohio Supreme Court decisions rejecting
tort reform legislation. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d at 1095. According to a later description, the act
attempts to "declare itself constitutional." Id. A legislature can not pass a law that declares itself
to be constitutional. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803) ("It is
empathetically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is.").
Nevertheless, the fact that the legislature passed the 1996 act, despite the holding in Morris,
demonstrates the fierceness of the struggle this Note describes.
192. Sheward, 715 NE.2d at 1068.
193. 715 N. .2d 1062 (Ohio 1999).
194. State ex rel. Ohio Acead. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1111 (Ohio
1999). Sheward was an original action in the Ohio Supreme Court by the Ohio Academy of
Trial Lawyers, seeking an extraordinary writ against the enforcement of the comprehensive Ohio
tort reform act Id. at 1068; see also supra note 16 (describing Ohio tort reform bill). The court
began by accusing the legislature of waging a frontal attack on the independence of the judi-
ciary. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d at 1071-75. Looking at the history of the Ohio court system, the
court demonstrated that Ohio courts have claimed the authority to pass on the constitutionality
of statutes since the mid-nineteenth century. Id. at 1076-79. The court then determined that the
case was an appropriate one for an extraordinary writ because the legislature had egregiously
overstepped the bounds of its authority. Id. at 1079-85. Turning to the specific claims, the
court struck down a statue of repose for construction services. Id. at 1087. The court found that
the statute attempted to overrule a previous decision striking down statutes of repose and to
enact the legal reasoning of the dissenting opinion. Id. The justices also voided a provision that
required a plaintiff to get a certificate of merit before filing a medical malpractice claim on the
grounds that it interfered with judicial authority to set rules of procedure for courts. Id. at 1087-
88. Next, the court struck down the legislature's attempt to modify the collateral source rule
on substantive due process grounds. Id. at 1090. Then, the court found that the cap on punitive
damages violated the state constitution's guarantee of a jury trial. Id. at 1091. Regarding the
noneconomic damages cap, the court found that it violated substantive due process because it
bore no rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. Id. at 1091-95. The court also
rejected the legislature's attempt to fix the summary judgment standard for toxic tort cases, id.
at 1095-96, and to force the admission of evidence that an expert witness and a defendant had
a common insurer, id. at 1096. Finally, the court further declared that the tort reform bill
violated the one-subject rule of the Ohio Constitution because "tort reform" was too broad a
subject for one bill. Id. at 1097-1102.
195. Id. at 1073. The court apparently considered that its earlier decision in Morris, striking
down the noneconomic damages cap on substantive due process grounds, "respeet[ed] the integ-
rity and independence" of the Ohio legislature.
196. Id. at 1071.
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due process."9 The court then dismissed the legislature's finding that the cap
bore a rational relationship to a legitimate state goal. The findings were 'Judi-
cial, not legislative in nature, and are being used to justify the reenactment of
legislation already determined to be unconstitutional."'19 "[N]o constitutional
difference" existed between the new statute and the one voided in Morris;
thus, the tort reform act could not stand.19
C. Analysis of the Challenges
When challenging damage caps under due process, equal protection, and
special legislation clauses, parties have focused on two general arguments:
First, parties often claim that the caps fail scrutiny under the substantive com-
ponent of due process clauses. 2" Second, they generally contend that the caps
create a legislative classification among injury victims - a classification they
find impermissible under equal protection and special legislation clauses.2"'
As demonstrated below, both arguments are flawed. 2°
1. Substantive Due Process Challenges and Rational Basis Analysis
The first step in any due process analysis is to ascertain the standard of
review."3 The federal scheme for resolving substantive due process chal-
lenges involves a two-tiered test. First, when a statute infringes upon funda-
mental rights, the federal standard requires that a court review the statute
using strict scrutiny.204 However, if no fundamental right is implicated, the
Due Process Clause of the federal Constitution requires only that the statute
have a rational relationship to a legitimate state interest. 20 5 In Virginia, courts
197. Id. at 1091-95.
198. Id. at 1094.
199. Id.
200. See Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765 (Ohio 1991) (upholding challenge to damage
cap based on substantive due process); Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Servs. of Richmond, Inc.,
509 S.E2d 307,317 (Va. 1999) (rejecting similar challenge).
201. See Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E2d 1057, 1069-78 (IlL 1997) (sustaining
special legislation and equal protection challenge to damage cap); Murphy v. Edmonds, 601
A.2d 102, 116 (Md. 1992) (rejecting equal protection challenge to damage cap); Etheridge v.
Med. Ctr. Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525,534 (Va. 1989) (same).
202. See infra Parts 1ll.C.1 & IlI.C.2 (elaborating on flaws in due process and equal proteo-
tion arguments).
203. See Sammon v. NJ. Bd. of Med. Examiners, 66 F.3d 639, 643-44 (3d Cir. 1995)
(explaining first step of due process analysis).
204. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (finding that infringement upon funda-
mental rights requires court to exercise strict scrutiny).
205. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955) (upholding statute
against due process challenge because it was rationally related to legislative objective).
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explicitly have stated that the due process clause of the state constitution has
the precise meaning and scope of the Due Process Clause of the federal
Constitution.' 6 In Ohio, the "due course of law" provision ofthe state consti-
tution °7 provides the same protections as the Due Process Clause ofthe Four-
teenth Amendment." Thus, both Virginia and Ohio employ the same two-
tiered structure for due process analysis that the federal Constitution employs:
strict scrutiny for statutes implicating a fundamental right and rational basis
scrutiny for other statutes.' °
The Virginia Supreme Court found that a damage cap implicated no
fundamental right and thus employed rational basis review, despite the pleas
of the plaintiffs for a more searching level of scrutiny.21 In Ohio, the plurality
ofthe Morris Court also determined that the damages cap affected no "funda-
mental right or suspect class" and thus qualified for review under the rational
basis test.' Later, in Sheward, a majority of the Ohio court endorsed the
Morris language, but cautioned against reading that language as a holding that
the damages cap did not interfere with the right to trial by jury.2 Neverthe-
206. See Leftwich v. Bevilacqua, 635 F. Supp. 238, 243 (W.D. Va. 1986) (finding that
Virginia due process clause has same meaning as federal clause); cf. Archer v. Mayes, 194
S.E.2d 707, 711 (Va. 1973) (commenting that Virginia equal protection clause is identical in
meaning to federal clause).
207. Oaro CONST. arL I, § 16.
208. See Keeton v. Mansifield Obstetrics & Gynecology Assocs., No. C80-1573A, 1981
WL 36207, at *6 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 5, 1981) (stating that state due course of law clause is
equivalent in meaning to federal one, and analyzing state claim under federal clause); Sorrell
v. Thevenir, 633 N.E.2d 504, 511 (Ohio 1994) ("The 'due course of law' provision [of OElO
CONST. art. I, § 16] is the equivalent of the 'due process of law' provision in the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution."); State ex rel. Heller v. Miller, 399 N.E.d 66,
67 (Ohio 1980) ("We look to federal case law to delineate [due process and equal protection
rights] under both the state and federal provisions."); City of Cleveland v. Nutter, 646 N.Ed
1209, 1210 (Ohio Mun. Ct. 1995) (finding federal and state due process guarantees "substan-
tially equivalent"). Butsee Stanton v. State Tax Comm'n, 151 N.E. 760,764 (Ohio 1921) (sug-
gesting state guarantee may be broader than federal one).
209. See Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E2d 765, 769-70 (Ohio 1991) (noting strict scrutiny
standard for due process analysis when statute implicates fundamental right, and rational basis
standard otherwise); Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Servs. of Richmond, Inc., 509 S.E.2d 307,
318 (same); see also Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973) (finding similar standards under
federal Constitution.).
210. See Pulliam, 509 S.E.2d at 318 (rejecting plaintif's argument for strict scrutiny
because court found no fundamental right implicated by damage cap).
211. See Morris, 576 N.E2d at 769-70 (determining that rational basis review is correct
level of scrutiny for damage cap).
212. See State ex rel Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062,1091-92
& n.14 (1999) (quoting Morris rational basis test, but implying that damages cap might im-
plicatejury trial guarantee). One Justice found that the damages cap implicated the right to trial
by jury, he applied strict scrutiny and determined that the cap could not survive. See Morris,
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less, the Sheward Court used the rational basis test, not the strict scrutiny test,
to strike down the new damages cap.2"3 In Ohio and Virginia, the rational
basis test appears to be the correct one for classifications disadvantaging tortvictims.214
576 N.E.2d at 780-81 (Sweeney, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (applying strict
scrutiny to strike down damages cap).
213. See Sheward, 715 NYE2d at 1095 (striking down damage cap because it is "unreason-
able and arbitrary," language from the rational basis test).
214. Cf supra Part IH.A (explaining that damage caps do not violate jury trial guarantees).
Although the Note has not undertaken a full analysis of the Ohio jury guarantee provision, the
provision is similar enough to those examined above that it appears likely a damage cap would
not violate the guarantee for the same reasons the damage caps of other states should survive.
Ohio guarantees jury trials only in those actions cognizable at common law. See Belding v. State
ex rel. Heiffer, 169 N.E. 301,302 (Ohio 1929) (finding jury trial exists only in actions cogniza-
ble at common law at time constitution was adopted); cf supra notes 69-76 and accompanying
text (same). Like other states upholding the cap from attack under jury trial guarantees, Ohio
recognizes no right to judgment on ajury verdict See Bartlebaugh v. Penn. Ry. Co., 82 N.E.2d
853, 855 (Ohio 1948) (upholding remittitur from state constitutional attack); cf. supra notes 93-
107 and accompanying text (finding no right to judgment on jury verdict). Moreover, the Ohio
legislature can abolish common law causes of action. See Clifton Hills Realty Co. v. City of
Cincinnati, 21 N.E.2d 993, 998 (Ohio Ct. App. 1938) ("A person has no right, no vested
interest, in any rule of the common law.'" (quoting Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113,134 (1876)));
cf supra notes 137.45 and accompanying text (explaining that damage caps are legislative
abolitions of actions for damages in excess of amount of cap). Thus, damage caps should survive
jury-trial guarantee attacks in Ohio for the same reasons they should in other states.
Some state courts have found a constitutional right to full recovery in tort and have there-
fore applied a higher level of scrutiny. See David Randolph Smith, Battling a Receding Tort
Frontier: ConstitutionalAttacks on MedicalMalpractce Laws, 38 OKLA. L. REV. 195,205-06
(1985) (finding that Arizona and Montana treat full recovery in tort as fundamental right). The
Montana Supreme Court applied strict scrutiny to a damage cap because of its determination that
full recovery in tort was a fundamental right and, thus, struck down the cap. White v. State, 661
P.2d 1272,1275 (Mont. 1983). Other states, such as New Hampshire, Idaho, North Dakota, and
Indiana, have applied intermediate scrutiny to tort reform efforts. Smith, supra, at 206-10. If
the constitution contains no language guaranteeing full recovery in tort as a fundamental right,
applying a heightened level of scrutiny arguably involves a judicial attempt to rewrite the
substantive tort law. See id. at 205 (stating that state cases recognizing fundamental right to full
recovery in tort ignore federal decisions "upholding economic and social legislation under
rationality principles). At least one commentator has suggested a relationship between the
standard of review and the survival of the cap. See Andersen, supra note 33, at 336 & n.54
(opining that caps subjected to heightened scrutiny are adjudicated unconstitutional and that ones
subjected to rational basis scrutiny survive). That observation was not true in Ohio. See Morris,
576 N.E2d at 771 (striking down damage cap under rational basis review).
Still other states explicitly ban damage caps in their constitutions, which is a legitimate
way to prohibit them without any judicial overreaching. See ApiZ. CoNST. art 18, § 6 ("The
right of action to recover damages for injuries shall never be abrogated, and the amount recov-
ered shall not be subject to any statutory limitation."); Smith, supra, at 205-06 (discussing
Arizona constitutional ban on damage caps). The Ohio and Virginia constitutions have no such
provisions.
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In both Ohio and Virginia, due process analysis entails review under a
standard similar to the federal one under which a statute survives if it is "ratio-
naly related to legitimate government interests." 215 In both states, the test is
not very searching. In Virginia, a court should resolve all doubts about legisla-
tion in favor of its constitutionality.2 6 "If any state of facts can be reasonably
conceived that would sustain [a statute], that state of facts at the time the law
was enacted must be assumed." '217 Ohio courts likewise acknowledge that they
must uphold a statute if"any conceivable set offacts"21' exists under which the
statute rationally furthers "any possible legitimate end of government.
219
Furthermore, in many Ohio court opinions rational basis analysis is as
cursory in practice as it seems intheory. " ° In a case decided justtwo years ago,
the Ohio Supreme Court took three sentences to decide that a statute created
jobs, that creation ofjobs is a legitimate state purpose, and that the questioned
statute is constitutional. 1 One Ohio Court of Appeals case simply quoted the
legislative statement of purpose to satisfy the legitimate state interest compo-
nent of due process analysis.' In another case, the Ohio Supreme Court
seemed quite willing to speculate on what reasons might exist for a statute.'
215. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702,728 (1997). The Virginia Supreme Court
articulates the test slightly differently, upholding the statute if it "has a reasonable relation to a
proper purpose and is not arbitrary or discriminatory." Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Servs. of
Richmond, Inc., 509 S.E.2d 307,318 (Va. 1999). The Ohio test is similar. The Ohio Supreme
Court will uphold a statute if it "bears a real and substantial relationship to 'public health or
welfare'" and if it is not "'unreasonable and arbitrary'." Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765, 769
(Ohio 1991); cf. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 537 (1934) (upholding statute that has "a
reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose" and is not "arbitrary [or] discriminatory").
216. See King v. Va. Birth-Related Neurological Injury Comp. Program, 410 S.E.2d 656,
659 (Va. 1991) (commenting that courts should resolve doubts about constitutionality of statute
in favor of upholding it).
217. Martin's Ex'rs v. Commonwealth, 102 S.E. 77,80 (Va. 1920). Although theMartin's
court made this statement in a special legislation context, the court has applied this language
to due process claims also. See King, 410 S.E.2d at 659-60 (applyingMartin's equal protection
analysis to due process claim).
218. Morris, 576 N.E.2d at 770.
219. Envirosafe Servs. of Ohio, Inc. v. City of Oregon, 609 N.E.2d 1290,1292 (Ohio Ct
App. 1992) (citing Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117 (1978)).
220. See supra notes 215-19 and accompanying text (outlining rational basis test).
221. See Desenco, Inc. v. City of Akron, 706 N.E.2d 323, 333 (Ohio 1999) (upholding
statute from substantive due process attack with cursory, conclusory analysis); cf Palm Beach
Mall, Inc., v. Cuyahoga County Bd. of Revision, 645 N.E.2d 767, 772 (Ohio CL App. 1994)
(determining in one paragraph that tax statute rationally related to orderly administration of state
tax system).
222. See Envirosafe, 609 N.E.2d at 1293-94 (quoting legislative declaration of purpose to
find legitimate government purpose in challenged statute).
223. See Holloway v. Brown, 403 N.E.2d 191, 198 (Ohio 1980) (finding that state can
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Nevertheless, in the tort reform context of Morris, the court found that
Ohio's damages cap failed the cursory rational basis test. '  A fortiori, the
Morris Court must have concluded that it could conceive of no set of facts
under which a damage cap would rationally relate to a legitimate state inter-
est.' The Ohio Legislature stated that it was stabilizing the "costs of health
care delivery, manufacturing, and the delivery of services."226 Stabilizing the
costs of health care delivery seems like a legitimate state interest, and the
Morris court did not suggest otherwise in its opinion. However, in a lengthy
analysis, the court determined that the cap would not have the effect of stabiliz-
ing liability costs.' This conclusion is poorly reasoned in at least two ways.
First, the evidence on the effectiveness of caps is at least inconclusive.
The Moms court cited a study that suggested no relationship between damage
caps and insurance premiums.' Nevertheless, some scholars have disagreed
with the court.=9 Liability insurance premiums increased sharply in the mid-
1970s, and again in the mid-1980s."0 One scholar noted that in the years 1974
and 1975, malpractice insurance premiums in some states increased by over
300%.1 In response to higher awards, insurers 'jacked up their rates, reduced
coverage limits, and increased dcductibles." 2 From 1984 to 1986, medical
malpractice insurance premiums almost doubled."ss Insurers and re-insurers
regulate professional donation solicitors because regulations rationally relate to "much greater
potential for misrepresentation and fraud" inherent in solicitors' actions).
224. See Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765,785 (Ohio 1991) (striking down damage cap
on due process grounds).
225. Cf id. at 770 (commenting that statutes will be upheld if they pass rational basis test
on any conceivable set of facts).
226. See Act of Sept 26, 1996, Am. Sub. HB. 350, 146 Ohio Laws 3567,4028 (citing
state's interest in "stabilizing costs" as reason for enacting damage cap).
227. See Morris, 576 N.E.2d at 770-71 (arguing that damage cap has no relationship to lia-
bility insurance premiums).
228. See id. (citing Texas Supreme Court study disputing correlation between malpractice
insurance premiums and damage caps, and citing similar study by Insurance Service Organiza-
tion). The court implicitly suggested that there was no liability crisis at all. Id. at 771.
229. See infra notes 23041 and accompanying text (discussing scholarly debate over lia-
bility crisis).
230. See HUBER, supra note 11, at 138 (comparing cost increases in mid-70s and 80s to
sudden earthquake).
231. Patricia M DanzonMedicalMalpracticeLiability, in LIABH=IY: PERSECTIVES AND
POLICY 101,101 (RobertE. Litan & Clifford Winston eds., 1988). Danzon blamed the increase
on "rising claim costs." 1d cf. Scott E. Harrington, Liability Insurance: Volatility in Prices and
in the Availability of Coverage, in TORT LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTERS 47, 77 (Peter H.
Schuck ed., 1991) (blaming rate increases of 1980s on "underestimated growth in claim costs").
232. HUBERsupra note 11,at 138.
233. W. Kip Viscusi & Patricia Born, Medical Malpractice Insurance in the Wake of
Liability Reform, 24 J. LEGAL STUD. 463,463 (1995).
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either escalated prices sharply or simply stopped writing policies altogether.234
These rising liability costs continued to plague the healthcare industry into the
1990s."5 Dealing with such a situation certainly seems like an important state
interest, especially ifthe difficulty in obtaining insurance reduced the availabil-
ity of medical services to the public.3
6
Furthermore, it appears that very large damage awards - the ones limited
by damage caps - accounted for a disproportionate fraction of the total
amount spent paying tort judgments. 237 One study indicated that half of all
dollars paid to settle medical malpractice claims went to satisfy only five
percent of claims filed.23 The study also found that the rate of increase in
premiums was smaller in states that had enacted damage caps. 239 A 1995
study of malpractice insurance in the late 1980s concluded that damage caps
eased the crisis by making the insurance business profitable again.24
Whether there indeed is a liability crisis in the country or whether dam-
age caps affect the crisis, issues that scholars sharply dispute,2 1 lies beyond
234. See HUBER, supra note 11, at 141 (reporting that insurers and reinsurers pulled out
of American market in mid-80s, viewing it as "'banana republic'"). Huber blamed escalating
jury verdicts for the cost increases and pointed out that it is difficult for an insurer to predict
what noneconomic damages a jury would award, for instance, to a mother rendered sterile by
a defective contraceptive device. Id. at 140. Because of this uncertainty, insurers raised rates
to a level that assured them a profit. Id. at 141. Even this practice sometimes failed to provide
sufficient funding to meet obligations, so some insurers stopped issuing the policies. IdM In
1986, thirty cities in California were unable to obtain any liability insurance coverage at all. Iai
at 139; see also George L. Priest, Puzzles of the Tort Crisis, 48 OHIO ST. L.L 497,497 (1987)
(referring to "the withdrawal of the insurance industry from the business of insurance").
235. See Smith, supra note 214, at 196-200 (summarizing 1980s studies showing crisis in
tort system); American Tort Reform Association, Facts orFiction: You Be the Judge, available
at http'Avww.atra.orglfcficthtm (last visited Feb. 24, 2001) (finding that liability costs
increased by 10% per year from 1990-1994, when inflation averaged 3 to 4% (citing
TINIwGHASTPOWERs PRRm, TORT CosT TRENDs:ANINTDmATONALPERspEcrivE (1995)).
236. Cf. Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Servs. of Richmond, Inc., 509 S.E.2d 307,315 (Va.
1999) (noting legislative determination that increase in liability insurance decreased availability
of medical services and threatened public health).
237. See Shirley Brantingham, Civil Justice Reform: The ContinuingSearch for Balance,
10 HAMLM L. REV. 387,401-02 (1987) (quoting PATICIA DANZON, NEW EVIDENCE ON TH3E
FREQUENCY AND SEVERiTY OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE CLAIMs 3 (1986) (reporting that large
damage awards constitute a disproportionate fraction of total amount oftortjudgments)).
238. Patricia M. Danzon, The Effects of Tort Reforms on the Frequency and Severity of
MedicalMalpractice Claims,48 OHIO ST.L.J. 413,416(1987).
239. See Danzon, supra note 231, at 101-02 ("[IThe rate of increase [of premiums] was
somewhat slower in states that enacted caps on awards and collateral source offsets.").
240. See Viscusi & Born, supra note 233, at 488-90 (concluding that damage caps in
Michigan and Wisconsin resulted in a "clear-cut shift in the performance of liability insurance").
241. Compare Danzon, supra note 238, at 413-17 (arguing that crisis exists and tort
reforms ameliorate it), with Richard L. Abel, The Real Tort Crisis- Too Few Claims, 48 OHIO
349
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the scope ofthis Note. However, the truth ofthe studies is less important than
the notion that they form a "conceivable set of facts" from which the Ohio
Legislature could conclude that its statute furthered the state's interest in
controlling liability costs for doctors and businesses.242 The Morris court
correctly stated the correct rational basis test, but misapplied it,2 Intuition
suggests that reducing large tort awards will reduce the level of the premiums
necessary to fund the awards. This may be factually wrong, but it is at least
plausible.244 By finding that the damages cap did not rationally relate to the
need to reduce the costs of liability, the Ohio Supreme Court essentially
disagreed with the legislature in an inconclusive scholarly debate about the
existence, scope, and solution to a tort liability crisis.
The second failure in the Morris court's reasoning is that it interferes
with legislative prerogatives much like the now discredited United States
Supreme Court decision in Lochner v. New York.24 In Lochner, the Court
ST. L.J. 443,446 (1987) (asserting that no liability crisis exists because insurance premiums still
represent a miniscule portion of costs), and Marc Galanter, Real World Torts: An Antidote to
Anecdote, 55 MD. L. REv. 1093, 1120-26 (1996) (opining that noneconomic damage awards
are not arbitrary and are not growing as quickly as awards for economic loss). Of course, Benja-
min Disraeli once commented that "[t]here are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies and
statistics." TIM OXFORD DICTIONARY OF QUOTATIONS 249 (1992).
242. See Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.E.2d 765,769 (Ohio 1991) (articulating concerns of Ohio
General Assembly); see also Minnesota v. Clover LeafCreamery Co., 449 U.S. 467,464 (1981)
(finding under rational basis test that legislature is "not required to convince the courts of the
correctness of their legislative judgments"). The question for determination, according to the
Clover Leaf Court, was whether the party challenging the statute showed that the facts support-
ing the statute's rationality "'could not reasonably be conceived to be true by the governmental
decisionmaker.'" Id. (quoting Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 111 (1979)). If the question is
"at least debatable" - and judging from the scholarly material on damage caps, it is - the court
must uphold the statute under rational basis review. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co.,
304 U.S. 144,154 (1938) (restricting inquiries into legislative judgment).
243. Cf Morris, 576 NE.2d at 770 (declaring that statute must stand if "any conceivable
state of facts" makes it rationally relate to a legitimate state objective).
244. See supra notes 239-40 and accompanying text (discussing evidence that caps
ameliorate liability crisis).
245. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). In Lochner, the defendant employer was convicted of violating
a New York labor law that prohibited an employee from working more than sixty hours per
week. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 52 (1905). In the United States Supreme Court, he
contended that his conviction violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
Id. at 53. The Supreme Court determined that the right to make a contract was part of the
substantive liberty of the individual protected by the Constitution. Id. This liberty included the
right of a laborer to sell as much labor as he liked. Id. Nevertheless, the Court decided that a
state could exercise its police powers to prevent the making of certain contracts; thus, the police
power comes into conflict with individual liberty. Id. at 53-54. The resolution of that conflict
turned on whether the state's exercise of its police power was "fair, reasonable, and appropriate"
or "unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary." Id. at 56. The Court found that there was no
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invoked the Fourteenth Amendment to invalidate a piece of socio-economic
legislation, a law establishing a maximum sixty-hour workweek in bakeries. 246
The legal theories underlying the Ohio Supreme Court's decisions in Moms
and Sheward are strikingly similar to those supporting Lochner, a decision
later Supreme Court cases sharply repudiated.2 47 In all three cases, courts took
sides in a policy dispute. In Lochner, the dispute was over whether laissez-
faire was an appropriate economic policy.248 In Morris and Sheward, the
question was whether damage caps are useful to solve a liability crisis. 249 In
each instance, the result was the same: The court read its own economic
theories into a constitution, creating a faulty precedent allowing the nullifica-
"reasonable foundation" for the act because there was no relationship to the number of hours
worked and the health of a worker. Id. at 58-60, 64. The Court upbraided legislatures for their
"interference... with the ordinary trades and occupations of the people." Id. at 63. Thus, the
Court reversed the conviction. Id. at 64-65.
246. See icl at 52 (stating facts); id. at 64 (striking down law). Justice Holmes vigorously
dissented. Id. at 74. He accused the Court of reading its economic theories into the Fourteenth
Amendment, theories to which some scholars did not subscribe. See id. at 75 (Holmes, 3., dis-
senting) ("[A] constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory.").
247. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730 (1963) (rejecting Lochner). The Court
found that-
The doctrine that prevailed in Lochner... and like cases - that due process autho-
rizes courts to hold laws unconstitutional when they believe the legislature has
acted unwisely - has long since been discarded. We have returned to the original
constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute their social and economic
beliefs for the judgment of legislative bodies, who are elected to pass laws.
Id. Many commentators have noticed the resemblance between decisions voiding damage caps
and the Lochner decision. See Brief for Amicus Curiae, Product Liability Advisory Council at
14-16, State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio 1999)
(arguing that striking down cap would resemble decision in Lochner); Smith, supra note 214,
at 207 (identifying Lochner resemblance); Richard C. Turkington, Constitutional Limitations
on Tort Reform: Have the State Courts Placed Insurmountable Obstacles in the Path of
Legislative Responses to the Perceived Liability Insurance Crisis?, 32 ViL. L. REV. 1299,
1308-10 (1987) (same). Turkington suspected that
[i]f Justice Holmes were alive today and tort reform legislation were challenged
under due process and equal protection claims, he would say that the fourteenth
amendment was not intended to embody the economic policies of the Insurance
Institute and those who support tort reform, or the theories of social justice es-
poused by the American Trial Lawyers Association and others who oppose tort
reform,
id. at 1309,just as Holmes wrote in 1905 that "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr.
Herbert Spencer's Social Statics." Lochner, 198 U.S. at 75 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
248. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 63 (criticizing legislature for interfering in economy).
249. See State ex rel Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1092
(Ohio 1999) (finding no relationship between damage caps and insurance premiums) (Ohio
1999); Morris v. Savoy, 576 N.EN2d 765,770-71 (Ohio 1991) (same).
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tion of laws with which the judiciary disagrees." The Supreme Court has
since spoken of its "abandonment of the use of the 'vague contours' of the
Due Process Clause to nullify laws which a majority of the Court believed to
be economically unwise."21 Yet, it seems Lochner is alive and well in Ohio.
To allow a court to sit as a "superlegislature" for the review of Ohio law is
contrary to the Ohio Constitution.
52
The evidence demonstrates that there is a set of facts from which a legis-
lature could conclude that capping damages would help solve the liability
insurance crisis. 3 That should end the rational basis inquiry.' When courts
strike down damage caps based on substantive due process, they usurp legisla-
tive power in a way the nation's highest court long ago repudiated.5
2. Equal Protection and Special Legislation Analysis
In Illinois, Virginia, and Maryland, courts have adjudicated challenges
to damage caps based on equal protection and special legislation clauses of the
state constitution. 6 Unlike a due process challenge, which focuses on the
reasonableness of a law as a whole, an equal protection or special legislation
challenge reviews the propriety of a statutory classification. 7 The state equal
protection clauses bear a close relationship to their federal counterpart, and
create the same standard of review."'
250. Compare Lochner, 198 U.S. at 62 (opining that it is "unreasonable and entirely
arbitrary" to think that relationship exists between health and hours worked), with Morris, 576
NE.2d at 770 (finding no "rational connection" between high jury verdicts and malpractice
insurance rates).
251. Ferguson, 372 U.S. at731.
252. See Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1071 (stating that Ohio court will not inquire into
wisdom of statute because that inquiry is legislative function). Compare OHio CONST. art IV,
§ 1 (authorizing judicial branch to exercise judicial power), with OHIO CONST. art II, § 1
(authorizing legislative branch to exercise legislative power) (emphasis added).
253. See supra notes 228-40 and accompanying text (sketching empirical data).
254. See supra notes 215-19 and accompanying text (outlining rational basis standard).
255. See supra notes 245-52 and accompanying text (comparing damage cap decisions
with repudiated Lochner opinion).
256. See, e.g., Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057,1069-78(111. 1997) (striking
down cap based on special legislation clause of Illinois Constitution); Murphy v. Edmonds, 601
A.2d 102, 107-16 (Md. 1992) (upholding cap against equal protection challenge); Etheridge v.
Med. Ctr. Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525, 532-33 (Va. 1989) (rejecting challenges to cap based on
special legislation and equal protection provisions).
257. See Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 609 (1974) (discussing distinction between due
process and equal protection clauses). Due process emphasizes fairness, equal protection
emphasizes disparity in treatment Ia
258. See Best, 689 N.E2d at 1070 ("A special legislation challenge generally is decided
under the same standards applicable to an equal protection challenge."); id. at 1071 (articulating
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Like a substantive due process analysis, an equal protection analysis first
entails determining what level of scrutiny to apply to a challenged classifica-
tion. s Theparties challenging the damage caps allegedthatthe caps discrimi-
nated against certain tort victims. 26 Courts in allthree states agree that classi-
fications burdening a fundamental right or discriminating against a suspect
class are subject to heightened scrutiny.2' However, courts in Illinois, Mary-
land, and Virginia all agree that tort victims do not constitute a suspect class;
therefore, the rational basis test is appropriate when evaluating the classifica-
tions. 2
The rational basis test in equal protection or special legislation analysis
is similar to the rational basis test for substantive due process analysis. 26 The
equal protection rational basis standard in considering whether classification is "rationally
related to a legitimate state interest" (quoting In re Village of Vernon Hills, 658 N.E2d 365,
367-68 (1L 1995))); cf Washington v. Glucksburg, 501 U.S. 702, 728 (1997) (stating that
federal rational basis standard asks if classification is "rationally related to a legitimate state
interest"). Courts in Virginia and Maryland explicitly stated that their equal protection guaran-
tees have exactly the same meaning as the federal guarantee. See Murphy, 601 A.2d at 107
(finding that Maryland's equal protection guarantee is synonymous with federal guarantee);
Archer v. Mayes, 194 S.E.2d 707, 711 (Va. 1973) (commenting that Virginia equal protection
clause is identical in meaning to federal clause). Maryland has no express equal protection
guarantee, but reads equal protection doctrine into the state constitution's due process clause.
Murphy, 601 A.2d at 107; cf. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497,499 (1954) (identifying equal
protection component in Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause).
259. See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456,461 (1988) (commenting that court applies different
levels of scrutiny to different challenged classifications).
260. See Best, 689 N.E2d at 1075-76 (reciting three alleged classifications created by
damage cap); Murphy, 601 A.2d at 108 (same).
261. See Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1071 (opining that strict scrutiny would apply to classifica-
tion burdening suspect class); Murphy, 601 A.2d at 109-10 (noting heightened level of scru-
tiny for classifications that discriminate against suspect classes or that burden fundamental
rights); Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Servs. of Richmond, Inc. 509 S.E.2d 307,318 (Va. 1999)
(same).
262. See Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1071 (Ill. 1997) (establishing
rational basis test for classifications involving tort victims); Murphy v. Edmonds, 601 A2d 102,
111 (Md. 1992) (same); Etheridge v. Medical Ctr. Hosps., 376 S.E.2d 525, 534 (Va. 1989)
(same). Virginia evaluates challenges based on it special legislation provision under a standard
similar to the rational-basis test See id. at 533 (commenting that special legislation challenge
will fail if classification is "a reasonable and not an arbitrary one"). Not all courts and commen-
tators employ a rational basis standard for classifications disadvantaging tort victims; some
apply heightened scrutiny. See Mary Ann Widlis, Comment, Limitation on Recovery ofDam-
ages MedicalMalpractice Cases: A Violation ofEqual Protection?, 54 U. CIN. L. REV. 1329,
1350-51 (1986) (advocating intermediate scrutiny for classifications disadvantaging tort
victims); supra note 214 (discussing states that apply heightened scrutiny to classifications
involving tort victims).
263. Cf. supra notes 215-19 and accompanying text (discussing rational basis test used in
due process analysis).
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court must uphold the law if the classification is rationally related to a legiti-
mate state interest.2" Once again, the test is not a searching one. Instead,
courts presume that the classification is constitutional and will uphold it if
"any set of facts" conceivably shows that the classification is rational. 5
The test is the same in all three states, but the courts somehow reached
different results. Under the rational basis test, the Virginia Supreme Court
and the Maryland Court of Appeals found that the classification between
slightly injured tort victims and severely injured tort victims is rational.2'
The Supreme Court of Virginia opined that the cap might bring down insur-
ance premiums and alleviate the difficulty medical providers experienced in
obtaining insurance.267 Similarly, the Maryland Court of Appeals found that
the cap might lead to reduced premiums and attract insurers back into the
market; thus, the legislature had not acted arbitrarily.268 In contrast, the i-
nois Supreme Court in Best found that the classification did not rationally
relate to a legitimate state interest.
2 69
The Best decision is poorly-reasoned in at least two ways. First, an
intuitively rational basis supports denying full recovery to severely injured
plaintiffs who win large verdicts but not denying it to slightly injured plain-
tiffs who win small verdicts. The Best court was not able to discern "how the
limiting of noneconomic damages in personal injury actions may be consid-
ered rationally related" to attempts to reduce liability costs.270 The rationale
seems obvious - large damage awards in fact create more tort liability than
small awards do. A five million dollar verdict will cost an insurance carrier
more than a five hundred thousand dollar verdict; thus, a five million dollar
verdict puts more pressure on an insurer to raise prices than a smaller verdict
does. Studies have suggested that the price increases in liability insurance are
fueled by increases in the cost of paying claims and that most money paid on
264. See In re Village of Vernon Iflls, 658 N.E.2d 365, 367-68 (111. 1995) (outlining
rational basis test); Murphy, 601 A.2d at 108 (same); Etheridge, 376 S.E.2d at 532 (finding that
court must uphold law if classification "bears 'a reasonable and substantial relation'" to legis-
lative goal).
265. Vernon Hills, 658 N.E.2d at 367; cf Murphy, 601 A.2d at 108 (noting presumption
of constitutionality); Martin's Ex'rs v. Commonwealth, 102 S.E. 77,80 (Va. 1920) (determining
that classification must stand if any conceivable state of facts supports it).
266. See infra notes 267-68 and accompanying text (discussing rejection of equal protec-
tion challenges in Virginia and Maryland).
267. See Etheridge, 376 S.E.2d at 533 (rejecting special legislation challenge).
268. See Murphy v. Edmonds, 601 A.2d 102, 114-15 (Md. 1992) (explaining why damage
cap does not violate equal protection guarantee).
269. See Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1076 (1L1. 997) (striking down
damage cap as arbitrary).
270. Best4 689 N.E.2d at 1077.
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claims is paid as part oflarge verdicts." Some scholars have disagreed, 2 but
whether the legislature is correct in its logic is irrelevant to a rational basis
analysis. As Professor Tribe explained, the rational-basis test operates
in the sphere of economic regulation quite apart from whether the "con-
ceivable state of facts" [used to justify a classification] (1) actually exists,
(2) would convincinglyjustify the classification if it did exist, or (3) has
everbeenurged inthe classification's defensebythose who either promul-
gated it or have argued in its support. 3
This idea finds support in Illinois Supreme Courtjurisprudence. z74 Passing on
the wisdom ofthe tort reform statute,2 5 the Best court took sides in a scholarly
debate on tort reform.
The second flaw in the Best decision lay in the court's inability to iden-
tify a legitimate state interest supporting the damage cap. The court rejected
the legislature's identified interest in reducing the "'systemic costs of tort
liability."' z 6 The court expressed confusion over what constituted "'systemic
costs of tort liability,"' but concluded that whatever this interest was, it had
nothing to do with damage caps. 7 Nevertheless, equal protection analysis
does not require the legislature to articulate any purpose for a classification;
thus, a court may look beyond the legislature's articulationsY
271. See supra notes 228-41 and accompanying text (discussing scholarly debate over
causes ofliability crisis).
272. See supra notes 228-41 and accompanying text (citing scholars who dispute existence
of liability crisis and effectiveness of damage caps).
273. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSITUTONAL LAW § 16-3, at 996 (1978); see
also supra note 205 (citing federal case on applying rational basis test).
274. See Bernier v. Burris, 497 N.E.2d 763, 768 (111. 1986) ("Where there was evidence
before the legislature reasonably supporting the classification, litigants may not procure invali-
dation of the legislation merely by tendering evidence in court that the legislature was mis-
taken." (quoting Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456,464 (1981))); Wenger
v. Finley, 541 N.E.2d 1220, 1225, 1226 (11. App. Ct. 1989) (commenting that court should
defer to legislative conclusions of logic when issue is "fairly debatable"); Hayes v. Mercy Hosp.
& Med. Ctr., 557 N.E.2d 873, 881 (Ill. 1990) (Ryan, J., specially concurring) (stating that legis-
lature need not convince court of correctness of its judgment).
275. But see Best, 689 N.E,2d at 1069 (stating that court is not concerned with wisdom of
statute). The Best court disavowed any intention to "balance the advantages and disadvantages
of reform." Id. at 1063. Nevertheless, the court scolded the legislature for its determination of
how to balance costs and benefits in the civil justice system. See id at 1077 ("[T]he prohibition
against special legislation does not permit the entire burden of the anticipated cost savings to rest
on one class ofinjured plaintiffs."). The court's complaint apparently is true even ifthe "one class
of injured plaintiffs" disproportionately causes the cost overruns. Cf supra notes 237-39 and
accompanying text (reporting that most money paid in claims is expended to pay large claims).
276. Best, 689 N.E.2d at 1077.
277. Id.
278. See Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 15 (1992) ("To be sure, the Equal Protection
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In a previous ease, the Illinois Supreme Court had identified a legitimate
state interest that applies to damage caps. 9 The court faced an equal protec-
tion challenge to a law establishing a special statute of limitations for medical
malpractice actions ° and upheld the statute.r The court recognized the
existence of a "medical malpractice insurance crisis" and concluded that a
legislative attempt to remedy the crisis by altering the statute of limitations
was reasonable.' In light of the court's recognition of the state's interest in
rectifying a liability insurance crisis, the court's confusion over the legislative
goals of damage caps seems disingenuous.
The Best court also insufficiently distinguished an earlier precedent in
which the Illinois Supreme Court sustained the constitutionality of a cap on
damages in wrongful death actions. ' 3 Although the case involved no equal
protection or special legislation challenge, the court sweepingly stated that in
a statutory cause of action (as opposed to a common law action), the legisla-
ture's "power to limit the maximum recovery... cannot be questioned.""t4
If a damage cap truly created an irrational classification between the slightly
injured and the severely injured, however, then that classification would be
irrational regardless of whether the cause of action arises from the common
law (like negligence) or from a statute (like wrongful death). The Best court
fails to explain why a damage cap was rational in 1957, when the court upheld
the wrongful death cap, but was irrational forty years later, when it considered
the tort reform bill.
Clause does not demand for purposes of rational-basis review that a legislature or governing
decisionmaker actually articulate at any time the purpose or rationale supporting its classifica-
tion.").
279. See Anderson v. Wagner, 402 N.E.2d 560,570,572 (11. 1979) (finding that remedy-
ing liability insurance crisis is legitimate state interest).
280. Id. at 561.
281. Id. at 573.
282. Id. at 562,570.
283. See Hall v. Gillins, 147 N.E.2d 352, 354 (I1. 1958) (sustaining constitutionality of
cap on damages in wrongful death action); cf Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057,
1072 n3 (I. 1997) (distinguishing Hall on basis that it is statutory cause of action, not
common law action).
284. Hall, 147 NE.2d at 354. Although the court nowhere stated in Hallthat the cap was
rational, and the parties in Hall did not raise an express equal protection argument, certainly the
court would not have sustained an irrational statute. Subsequent cases citing Hall distinguish
it rather than overrule it; presumably it stands as good law. See Best, 689 N.EY2d at 1071,1072
n.3 (distinguishing Hall); Wright v. Cent Du Page Hosp. Ass'n, 347 N.Ed 736, 742 (I1.
1976) (distinguishing Hall in case striking down damage cap on economic medical malpractice
damages). The Illinois Supreme Court also has upheld a damage cap in a dramshop act See
Cunningham v. Brown, 174 NE.2d 153, 157 (Ill. 1961) (refusing other remedy as circumven-
tion of damage cap in dramshop action).
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In summary, Ohio and Illinois courts both invalidated their damage caps
for failure to rationally relate to a legitimate state objective.2 5 Ohio courts
did so under the Ohio due process clause, and Illinois courts applied an equal
protection analysis.2" This conclusion is illogical, counterintuitive, and seems
to relate more to the courts' policy judgment about damage caps than to the
constitutional merits of the stattes.?7
IV Challenges to Damage Caps Based on Abuse of
Legislative Prerogatives
The framers of the federal Constitution designed the government so that
each branch would have its own area of responsibility and yet maintain some
control over the others.s This Part analyzes challenges to damage caps based
on allegedly improper use of legislative prerogatives. Specifically, it reviews
an allegation that a legislature exceeded its power to change the common
law 9 and a legislature's attempt to alter a trial court's jurisdiction.'
A. The Legislature as Boss: The Quid Pro Quo Requirement
and the Kansas Experience
In Kansas Malpractice F1 ctims Coalition v. Bell, 1 the Kansas Supreme
Court declared unconstitutional a $250,000 limit on noneconomic damages
in medical malpractice cases.' Only two years later, in Samsel v. Wheeler
285. See supra notes 228-52, 267-82 and accompanying text (exploring reasoning of
opinions in Illinois and Ohio striking down caps).
286. See supra notes 225-249, 270-84, and accompanying text (discussing reasoning of
Ohio and Illinois courts).
287. Cf. Werber, supra note 10, at 1159 ("[I]t is apparent that the [Ohio Supreme Court]
is fostering its tort policy beliefs through constitutional analysis.").
288. See THE FEDERALIST No. 51, supra note 1, at 347-48 (explaining establishment of
three branches of federal government and proposing that they act as check on one another).
289. See Kan. Malpractice Victims Coalition v. Bell, 757 P.2d 251, 260-64 (Kan. 1988)
(adjudicating challenge to damage cap alleging that legislature illegally abridged common law).
290. See State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 NYE.2d 1062, 1094
(Ohio 1999) (rejecting attempt to alter trial court jurisdiction).
291. 757 P.2d 251 (Kan. 1988).
292. See Kansas Malpractice Victims Coalition v. Bell, 757 P.2d 251, 260 (Kan. 1988).
(striking down cap). In Bell, the Kansas Malpractice Victims Coalition claimed that the Kansas
tort reform law was unconstitutional. Il at 253. The tort reform act in question capped
noneconomic damages at $250,000 and capped total recovery at $1,000,000 in all medical
malpractice actions. Id. Under the act, if the $1,000,000 turned out to be insufficient to meet
a successful plaintiff's future medical expenses, the plaintiff could petition a court for supple-
mental payments from a special state fumd. Id. at 255-56. These supplemental payments might
total $3,000,000 or the amount of the jury verdict, whichever was smaller. Id. The plaintiffs
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Transport Services,' the same court upheld a very similar $250,000 cap and
distinguished Bell. 94 Ultimately, the legislature was able to pass a cap that
survived the Kansas Supreme Court's constitutional scrutiny.295 Because the
legislature triumphed in the end, the Kansas experience offers hope for those
supporting damage caps.9 6
Generally, a state legislature may pass statutes modifying the common
law of the state.' That power includes the power to abolish common law
actions.'9 In Kansas, however, the legislature is not entirely free to modify
the common law; it cannot abolish a common law right or remedy without
providing an adequate substitute remedy.' This limitation on legislative
power is known as the quid pro quo rule.3"°
Striking down the cap in Bell, the Kansas Supreme Court equated the cap
on damages with abolishing the cause of action for damages in excess of the
statutory amount.301 In many states that would end the inquiry, but not in
contended that the cap violated their right to a jury trial. Id. at 258. The Bell court determined
that the jury trial right extended to all actions cognizable at common law, that negligence
actions were among these, and that the right to a jury trial includes the right to have a jury
determine damages. Id. However, the court noted that the legislature can modify the right to
a jury trial by abolishing common law causes of action through its power to change the common
law. Id at 260, 264. When the legislature exercises its power to abolish a common law action,
however, it must provide an "adequate substitute remedy" or quid pro quo. Id. at 259, 263.
Here, the damage caps interfered with a common law cause of action, but failed to provide any
quid pro quo to an injured plaintiffwhose common law action for damages in excess of the cap
was abolished. Ma at 264. Thus, the Bell court declared the cap unconstitutional. Id. at 265.
293. 789 P.2d 541 (Kan. 1990). For a summary ofSamsel, see supra note 37.
294. Samsel v. Wheeler Trans. Sews., 789 P.2d 541,558 (Kan. 1990) (upholding cap).
295. Id.
296. Compare id. (upholding cap), with Bell, 757 P.2d at 260 (striking down previous cap).
297. See 15A AM. JUR. 2D Common Law, § 15, at 581-82 (2000) (commenting that state
legislature may change common law).
298. See id. § 15, at 582 (reporting that legislature can "entirely abrogate" rules of common
law).
299. See Kan. Malpractice Victims Coalition v. Bell, 757 P.2d 251, 258-59 (Kan. 1988)
(identifying quid pro quo requirement for modification of common law); Rajala v. Doresky, 661
P.2d 1251, 1253 (Kan. 1983) (upholding mandatory workers compensation coverage against
charge that it impermissibly abolished common law action against employer, on grounds that
statute provided adequate substitute remedy).
300. Bell, 757 P.2d at259.
301. See id. at 258 ("Mhe legislature can modify the right to ajury trial through its power
to change the common law."); id. at 264 (finding that legislature has "abolished the right to a
remedy"). As discussed above, damage caps in essence abolish the cause of action for damages
in excess of the amount of the cap. See supra Part ILC.3 (discussing conceptualization of
damage caps as abrogating causes of action and explaining that this conceptualization avoids
any suggestion that damage caps burden right to jury trial).
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Kansas. 2 The Bell court explained that the cap was unconstitutional because
it involved no quid pro quo; an injured plaintiff received nothing in return for
the abolition of the cause of action.' °
The damage cap at issue in Bell applied only to medical malpractice
actions. °4 In 1987, before the Bell decision, the legislature had passed
another damage cap that applied to all personal injury actions.'m After Bell,
the United States District Court for the District of Kansas certified to the
Kansas Supreme Court the question of the second cap's constitutionality.-
0 6
At the same time, the legislature began to debate an amendment to the state
constitution that would grant it the power to enact damage caps.mn
In this atmosphere, the Kansas Supreme Court issued atwo page opinion
declaring the second cap constitutional.' The court explained that "[b]ecause
of the widespread interest and statewide effect of the court's determination of
this question, we announce our decision in this brief opinion. A formal
opinion expressing the views of the members of the court will be filed when
it is prepared.
''3
Nearly a year passed before the court issued its formal opinion on the
second statute in Samsel v. Wheeler Transport Services.31° In the second
statute, the court found the necessary quid pro quo that it failed to find in the
302. See Murphy v. Edmonds, 601 A.2d 102, 116 (Md. 1992) (upholding damage cap on
grounds that legislature had abolished cause of action for damages in excess of cap); Pulliam
v. Coastal Emergency Serva. of Richmond, Inc., 509 S.Eld 307,314 (Va. 1999) (same). But
see Bell, 757 P.2d at 264 (striking down cap).
303. Bell, 757 P.2d at 264-65.
304. See it at 253 (commenting that reach of cap extends only to medical malpractice
actions).
305. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-19a01 (1994) (capping damages in actions for personal
injury at $250,000). The statute applies only to actions accruing between July 1,1987, and July
1, 1988. Id. A nearly identical statute extended the provisions of the cap to actions accruing
after July 1,1988. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-19a02 (1994).
306. See Samsel v. Wheeler Trans. Servs., 789 P.2d 541,543 (Kan. 1990) (reporting certi-
fication of question).
307. See id. at 559 (Herd, J., dissenting) (commenting that Kansas Legislature debated
amendment as court discussed case). Justice Herd accused the majority of acting to forestall the
amendment and of leaving the impression that the Samsel decision, which upheld the second
cap, was politically motivated. Id (Herd, J., dissenting). The Kansas Supreme Court decided
that the same language that did not constitute a quid pro quo in Bell established a quid pro quo
in Samsel. See infra note 312 (comparing language in two statutes). One wonders why the Bell
court did not notice the quid pro quo in the first statute.
308. See Samsel v.Wheeler Trans. Ses., 771 P.2d 71,72 (Kan. 1989) (upholding damage
cap on March 30, 1989).
309. IU. at 72.
310. See Samsel, 789 P.2d at 541 (recording date ofdecision as March 21,1990).
359
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first statt.3 11 Interpreting the same language that appeared in the first
statute, the court determined that the second cap required a judge to enter
judgment in the amount of the cap when a jury returned a verdict in excess of
the cap. 12 The court decided that under the second statute, no remittitur was
available. 13 Because a plaintiff no longer had to worry that a judge would
find the verdict excessive and reduce it below $250,000, the party losing the
common law right gained something in return."14 Thus, the new statute was
constitutional because of the legislative power to change the common law. 15
The Kansas experience is instructive because it exemplifies a state in
which the legislature is '"boss."'316 In the struggle over damage caps, the legis-
lature lost the first battle, but won the war." It did so by providing the plain-
tiff with something at the same time it took away something else.1 " Parties
elsewhere should take note of the quid pro quo argument, especially if the
relevant jurisdiction imposes a quid pro quo requirement.319 A court bent on
311. See id at 558 (finding quid pro quo in statute).
312. See Samsel v. Wheeler Trans. Servs., 789 P.2d 541,557-58 (fitding quid pro quo in
statute because cap forbids court from lowering award to less than $250,000). Compare the first
statute, 1996 Kan. Sess. Laws 229 ("If the verdict results in an award for noneconomic loss
which exceeds the limit of this section, the court shall enter judgment for [the amount of the
cap] for all the party's claims for noneconomic loss") (emphasis added), with the second statute,
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-19a02(d) (1994), which has exactly the same language.
313. See Samsel, 789 P.2d at 557-58 (deciding that second damage cap statute did not
permit remittitur).
314. See id. (articulating existence of quid pro quo in cap).
315. See id. at 557 (recognizing legislative power to alter or abolish common law actions
when it provides quid pro quo).
316. See id. at 558 (upholding statute but questioning its wisdom).
317. Compare Kan. Malpractice Victims Coalition v. Bell, 757 P.2d 251, 264-65 (Kan.
1988) (striking down damage cap), with Samsel v. Wheeler Trans. Servs., 789 P.2d 541, 558
(Kan. 1990) (upholding revised cap).
318. See Samsel, 789 P.2d at 558 (describing quid pro quo in statute).
319. See generally Howard Alan Learner, Note, ResbictiveMedicalMalpractice Compen-
sation Schemes: A Constitutional "Quid Pro Quo" Anaysis to Safeguard IndiMdual Liberties,
18 HARv. . ONLEGIS. 143,200-01 (1981) (arguing that quid pro quo analysis is least intrusive
way to review damage cap statutes); cf Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc.,
438 U.S. 59, 87-88 (1978) (rejecting Fifth Amendment challenge to damage cap at least in part
because Congress provided quid pro quo). At least one other state has mentioned the lack of a
quid pro quo when striking down a damage cap statute, suggesting that courts in other states
might also look favorably on a Kansas-style statute. See Smith v. Dep't of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080,
1088 (Fla. 1987) (finding that legislature might restrict right of remedy if it provides "reasonable
alternative remedy or commensurate benefit"). However, because the majority rule allows free
alteration of the common law, many courts will not even consider any quid pro quo argument
See 15AAM. JU. 2D Common Law § 15, at 582 (2000) (commenting that state legislature may
change common law). Therefore, this argument enjoys only limited applicability.
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finding a way to strike down tort reform may very well be undeterred. Never-
theless, in Kansas, providing a "carrot" for the plaintiff made a damage cap
possible even though a previous one had failed judicial scrutiny.
3 20
B. Legislative Control over Trial Court Jurisdiction
The United States Constitution provides Congress with the power to
create lower courts and the power to set the jurisdiction of the United States
Supreme Court. 21 On occasion, Congress has removed specific subjects from
the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court." Similarly, some state constitutions
grant jurisdiction-setting power to state legislatures.3 1 The jurisdiction-
setting power of legislatures provides yet another avenue by which legisla-
tures might maintain the constitutionality of damage caps.
The Ohio Constitution provides that "the courts of common pleas and
divisions thereof shall have such original jurisdiction over all justiciable
matters... as may be provided by law."324 In its most recent version of the
damage cap statute, the Ohio Legislature attempted to utilize this provision."
The statute provided that "[t]he court of common pleas shall not have jurisdic-
tion to award compensatory damages for noneconomic loss that exceed the
amounts set forth [in the damage cap]."
326
The Ohio Supreme Court rejected this provision with a cursory anal-
ysis." The Sheward court asserted:
320. See supra Part IVA (discussing how Kansas court ultimately upheld cap).
321. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 9 (granting Congress power to create lower federal
courts); id. art. I, § 2, cL 2 (authorizing Congress to make "Exceptions" and "Regulations"
regarding Supreme Court jurisdiction). The congressional power to create lower federal courts
includes the power to set their jurisdiction. See Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441, 449
(1849) ("Courts created by statute can have no jurisdiction but such as the statute confers.").
322. See Exparte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 515 (1868) (upholding statute abro-
gating Supreme Court jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus appeals of certain ex-Confederates);
cf. WIEU.AM COHEN& JONATHAND. VARAT, CONSTmTrIONAL LAW 42-43 (1997) (discussing
congressional proposals to strip Supreme Court of jurisdiction over abortion and school prayer
cases).
323. See Omo CONST. art. IV, § 4(B) authorizing legislature to set jurisdiction of trial
courts); VA. CoNsT. art VI, § 1 (same).
324. OHo CONST. art IV, § 4(B).
325. See Act of Sept 26, 1996, Am. Sub. H.B. 350, 146 Ohio Laws 3567,4028 (noting
legislative jurisdiction-setting power and citing Ohio Constitution's provision providing Ohio
legislature with jurisdiction-setting power).
326. OHo REv. STAT. ANN. § 2305.01 (West Supp. 2000).
327. See State exrel. OhioAcad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062,1094-95
(Ohio 1999) (rejecting legislative attempt to enact damage cap by setting trial court jurisdic-
tion).
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We have held, as the General Assembly asserts, that "thejurisdiction ofthe
common pleas courts is limited to whatever the legislature may choose to
bestow." However, we have never allowed this rubric to be employed in
an effort to shield legislation from judicial review or deprive the courts of
jurisdiction to enforce a constitutional right The General Assembly may
not gain the authority to take away a constitutional right by the simple
expedient oflimiting thejurisdiction ofthe courts to the parameters of its
own unconstitutional Act. "What the constitution grants, no statute may
take away. On
A long line of Ohio cases speaks of the legislature's jurisdiction setting
power in sweeping language: The Ohio Supreme Court has deemed "funda-
mental" the principle that courts can exercise only the jurisdiction the legisla-
ture bestows upon them. 2 As recently as 1991, the court declared that
"[a]lthough the Court of Common Pleas is a court of general jurisdiction, the
jurisdiction it may exercise must be found either expressly or by necessary
implication in statutory enactments." 33 Older precedent agree.3 1 When the
legislature has not granted jurisdiction, a court simply cannot act.'
In light of this authority, the Ohio Supreme Court in Sheward never
explained adequately why the legislature could not divest the trial courts of
jurisdiction over causes seeking damages in excess of the cap. Because a
party can always obtain review by appealing a final order dismissing an action
328. IM (citations omitted). For the irrelevant proposition it asserted - -What the constitu-
tion grants, no statute may take away" - the Sheward court cited only a 1922 case that had
nothing to do with jurisdiction. Id. (citing State ex. reL Hoel v. Brown, 138 NE. 230 (Ohio
1922) (reviewing statute providing for removal of board ofinspections official)).
329. See Humphrys v. Putnam, 178 NX.2d 506, 509 (Ohio 1961) ("It is fundamental,
however, that courts have only such jurisdiction as is conferred upon them by the Constitu-
tion or by the Legislature acting within its constitutional authority."Y, State ex reL Finley v.
Pfeiffer, 126 N.E.2d 57, 61 (Ohio 1955) (finding jurisdiction of courts limited to that granted
by law).
330. Franklin County Law Enforcement Ass'n v. Fraternal Order of Police Capital City
Lodge No. 9, 572 N.E2d 87, 90 (Ohio 1991) (quoting Fletcher v. Coney Island, Inc., 134
N.E.2d 371,375 (Ohio 1956)).
331. SeeMattone v. Argentina, 175 NE. 603,605 (Ohio 1931) (commenting thatjurisdic-
tion of trial courts is fixed by legislative enaciment); Sheldon's Lessee v. Newton, 3 Ohio St
494, 499 (1854) (Warden & Smith) ("But before [jurisdiction] can be affirmed to exist, it must
be made to appear that the law has given the tribunal capacity to entertain the complaint against
the person or thing sought to be charged or affected.. ."); State v. Belonski, 153 NE. 160,160
(Ohio Ct App. 1926) (commenting on limited nature oftrial court jurisdiction).
332. See Dilatush v. Bd. of Review, Bureau of Unemployment Comp., 160 NE.2d 309,
311 (Ohio Ct App. 1959) (per curiam) (stating that jurisdiction is basic perquisite to any court
action).
333. Cf State ex reL Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1095
(Ohio 1999) (discussing jurisdiction question).
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for want of jurisdiction,33 the jurisdiction-stripping provision would not, as
the court suggested, "shield legislation from judicial review."33' Furthermore,
the Sheward court failed to specify which "constitutional right" the juris-
diction-stripping law took away.336 Nothing in the Ohio constitution or case-
law grants a right to have jurisdiction over a particular action in a specific
court.337 At first glance, the "right to a remedy" provision ofthe Ohio Consti-
tution might suggest that jurisdiction over all actions must vest in some
court.338 Nevertheless, as the Ohio Court of Appeals explained, the right to
a remedy clause
guarantees a remedyfor every legally cognizable injurytoperson, property
or reputation. Anditmustultimatelybeuptothelegislatureto define what
injuries are legally cognizable. [The clause] is not a petrifier of every
cause of action that existed in this state when the section was adopted. If
it were, all statutes in derogation of common-law rights ofaction would be
vulnerable to constitutional attack. Thatthisis notthe case couldbe shown
by many examples?
At a minimum the right to a remedy clause does not prevent the legislature
from abolishing tort actions entirely, effectively removing them from the
jurisdiction of all Ohio courts.' By removing causes of action for damages
in excess of the cap from the jurisdiction of Ohio trial courts, the legislature
rendered them legally non-cognizable and abolished them.34 The right to a
remedy clause does not prevent this. 42
The jurisdiction-stripping conceptualization of damage caps provides yet
another justification for their constitutionality. When a legislature has the
power to bestow or withhold jurisdiction, the legislature can create a damage
cap by removing from courts the jurisdiction over actions for damages in
334. See Onio CONST. art. IV, § 3(bX2) (granting Ohio Court of Appeals jurisdiction to
review final orders of lower courts).
335. Id.
336. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d at1094.
337. See Oaio CONST. art TV, § 4 (B) (committingjurisdiction oftrial court to legislature);
supra notes 329-32 (citing cases on legislative power over trial court jurisdiction).
338. See OHIo CONST. art , §16 ("All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury
done him in his land, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law.").
339. Vrabel v. Vrabel, 459 N.E2d 1298,1305-06 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983).
340. See ad at 1307 (upholding legislative abolition oftort causes of action).
341. See OHio REV. STAT. ANN. § 2305.01 (West Supp. 2000) (abrogating trial court
jurisdiction over causes of action for damages in excess of statutory cap); cf Vrabel, 495 N.E2d
at 1305 (finding that right to remedy clause guarantees remedy only for legally cognizable
injuries).
342. See supra notes 338-41 and accompanying text (discussing right to remedy clause).
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excess of its cap. 43 In Sheward, the Ohio Supreme Court never satisfactorily




Damage caps are falling across the country, under challenges based on
jury trial guarantees, 345 due process,"4 equal piotection, 47 and various other
arguments. 3 48 Often, courts betray both logic and precedent in the course of
analyzing damage caps.4 The cases reflect a struggle between legislatures
and courts for control over the civil justice system.
3 50
So the struggle continues. Like so many other tort issues, damage caps
have been caught in the battle between legislatures and courts. This Note
has demonstrated that the better-reasoned decisions uphold the caps from
constitutional attack.51 In most instances, they violate neither the right to a
jury trial,352 nor substantive due process,353 nor equal protection." 4 Further-
more, inherent legislative power over the common law355 and court jurisdic-
343. Cf OHo REV. STAT. ANN. § 2305.01 (West Supp. 2000) (attempting to strip trial
court ofjurisdiction for actions in excess of cap).
344. Cf State ex rel. Ohio Acad. of Trial Lawyers v. Sheward, 715 N.E.2d 1062, 1095
(Ohio 1999) (rejecting jurisdiction-stripping power).
345. See, e.g., Moore v. Mobile Infirmary Ass'n, 592 So. 2d 156,164 (Ala. 1991) (strildng
down cap because of jury trial guarantee); Lakin v. Senco Prods., Inc., 987 P.2d 463, 473-75
(Or. 1999) (same); Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 771 P.2d 711, 722-23 (Wash. 1989) (same);
supra Part H (discussing jury trial challenges to damage caps).
346. See Morris v. Savoy, 576 NE.2d 765, 771 (Ohio 1991) (finding that damage cap
violates substantive due process).
347. See, e.g., Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057,1070-78 (11.1997) (striking
down damage cap based on equal protection clause);; Carson v. Maurer, 424 A2d 825, 835-38
(N.H. 1980) (same); Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125,135-36 (N.D. 1978) (same).
348. See Smith v. Dep't of Ins., 507 So. 2d 1080, 1087-89 (Fa 1987) (striking down
cap based on state constitutional clause requiring courts to be open); Lucas v. United States,
757 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1988) (same); supra note 23 (commenting on takings clause theory of
attack).
349. See supra Parts KC, IILC, & IV.B (criticizing state court decisions striking down
caps).
350. See Werber, supra note 10, at 1156 (reporting existence of "struggle" in Ohio).
351. See supra Parts ILC, DILC, & TV (arguing that better-reasoned decisions sustain
damage caps).
352. See supra Part HI (analyzing jury trial challenges to damage caps).
353. See supra Part IILA (discussing substantive due process challenge to damage caps).
354. See supra Part IILB (examining equal protection challenge to damage cap).
355. See supra Part IVA (commenting on legislative power over common law and
explaining quid pro quo doctrine).
364
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tion35 6 argue strongly in favor of caps' constitutionality. Nevertheless, some
courts are unable to resist the temptation to legislate. Indeed, in the words of
one state supreme court justice, some courts seem committed to their "attempt
to overrule, by judicial fiat, the considered judgment of the legislature. 357
Sadly, in many states true tort reform may require amending the state constitu-
tion.358 Only time will tell who is the ultimate boss of tort law.
356. See supra Part IV.B (arguing that legislative power over trial court jurisdiction val-
idates damage caps).
357. Best v. Taylor Mach. Works, 689 N.E.2d 1057, 1113 (I1. 1997) (Miller, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part).
358. Cf Delashmutt v. Myers, 992 P.2d 442, 442-43 (Or. 1999) (discussing proposed
constitutional amendment). In 1999, the Oregon Legislature proposed an amendment to the
state constitution to overturn Lakin v. Senco Products, Inc., 987 P.2d 463 (Or. 1999), the case
that struck down Oregon's damage cap. Delashmut, 992 P.2d at 442; see also supra note 61
(summarizing Lakin). The proposed amendment would have provided that "[n]otwithstanding
any other provision of this Constitution, the Legislative Assembly by law may impose limita-
tions on the damages that may be recovered in civil actions." Delashmutt, 992 P.2d at 443.
Voters overwhelmingly defeated the amendment in a referendum in May 2000, after trial
lawyers spent $1.6 million on an ad campaign featuring Erin Brockovich. Steve Suo, Voters
Sink Ballot Measures, THE OPEGONL4N, May 17, 2000, at Al. The anti-amendment forces
outspent tort reform supporters by a 2-1 margin. Id.

